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EMERGENCE OF LGBT RIGHTS 
Jeffrey Kosbie 
ABSTRACT 
The right to privacy, as applied to LGBT rights, is often described as a sort of tolerance:  Sexuality is tolerated 
as long as it remains hidden in the bedroom.  This tension between tolerance and open expression of sexuality has 
been at the center of numerous debates over LGBT legal strategy.  Thus, this Article argues for a counter-intuitive 
result:  The right to privacy has also been used to advance the seemingly more radical right to be sexual. 
This Article excavates the early history of LGBT legal organizing in order to show how the tension between the 
right to privacy and the right to sexuality has played out within the LGBT legal movement, and how the right to 
privacy was shaped by and shared overlapping concerns with the right to be sexual.  In order to support this claim, 
this Article takes a deep dive into the world of LGBT legal organizing in the 1960s and 1970s.  This Article 
shows how contrasting visions over LGBT rights shaped the issues that became important and the claims that 
activists made in court. 
After examining the organizational history of early LGBT rights, this Article turns specifically to discussions 
between LGBT lawyers regarding sodomy reform. By tracing the decisions leading up to Bowers v. Hardwick, 
this Article shows how claims to the right to privacy were in tension with but also ultimately shaped by ideas 
about the right to be sexual. 
The payoff for this historical excavation is a richer understanding of the role of activist lawyers in pushing new 
constitutional meanings.  This Article concludes with a discussion of how the right to be sexual helps us to 
understand the relationship between dignity and the identity-based logic of LGBT rights.  
 
  Associate, Gibbs Law Group LLP.  I am enormously grateful to mentors and colleagues who gave 
detailed feedback on various drafts of this Article, including David Cruz, Craig Konnoth, Andy 
Koppelman, Doug NeJaime, and Chris Schmidt.  For additional helpful comments, I thank Ellen 
Ann Andersen, Noa Ben-Asher, Luke Boso, Michael Boucai, Pat Cain, John Culhane, Shari 
Diamond, Steve Engel, Bill Eskridge, Suzanne Goldberg, Jim Lindgren, and Gwyn Leachman.  I 
also thank all the lawyers who generously gave their time and energy to supporting this project.  In 
particular, I thank Matt Coles, Kate Kendell, Ben Klein, Jay Kohorn, Jenny Pizer, Ben Schatz, 
and Evan Wolfson in this regard. Previous versions of this article were presented at the Annual 
LGBT Bar Association Conference (Lavender Law) and the Legal Scholarship Workshop at 
Northwestern Law, and I thank participants in those venues for their feedback.  
1390 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1391 
I.  DEFINING THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL .............................................. 1392 
II.  TRACING THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL IN EARLY LGBT LEGAL 
ORGANIZING ............................................................................... 1396 
A.  Homophile Organizations ..................................................................... 1401 
B.  National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties .......................................... 1404 
C.  National Gay Task Force ..................................................................... 1405 
D.  The New LGBT Legal Organizations .................................................... 1408 
 1.  How the LGBT Legal Organizations Talked About Litigation ................. 1413 
 2.  National Educational Foundation for Individual Rights ........................... 1417 
III.  SODOMY REFORM AND THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL ..................... 1419 
A.  Sodomy Roundtables ............................................................................ 1421 
B.  Pre-Hardwick Sodomy Reform Litigation ................................................ 1424 
C.  Debates over Hardwick and the Right to Be Sexual ................................... 1428 
IV.  CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL ................ 1432 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 1439  
August 2020] THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL 1391 
INTRODUCTION 
When the history of LGBT rights is told, it is often told as one of triumph, 
victory, or a dream fulfilled.1  In this telling, LGBT rights is the story of going 
from a time when “homosexuals were virtually without constitutional rights” 
to “a twenty-first-century America in which gays can marry” throughout the 
country.2  But while much of this history has been told before, this Article 
argues that the dominant understanding of it is incomplete. 
Before LGBT rights emerged as a coherent category, the “right to be 
sexual” offered an alternate model for LGBT activists.3  To oversimplify, 
claims of LGBT rights describe gay people as basically the same as everyone 
else and deserving of protection from discrimination on that basis.4  Claims 
of the right to be sexual describe gay people as basically different from 
everyone else and deserving of dignity and respect for their sexual choices.5  
LGBT rights asks for the state to leave LGBT people alone.  The right to be 
sexual demands state recognition and support. 
This Article excavates the early history of LGBT legal organizing in order 
to show how the tension between the right to privacy and the right to be 
sexual has played out within the LGBT legal movement, and how the right 
to privacy was shaped by and shared overlapping concerns with the right to 
be sexual.  In order to support this claim, the article takes a deep dive into 
the world of LGBT legal organizing in the 1960s and 1970s.  This Article 
shows how contrasting visions of LGBT rights shaped the issues that became 
important and the claims that activists made in court. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I reviews historical writings on 
the right to be sexual before offering my own full definition of it.  This Article 
argues for the normative desirability of the right to be sexual and compare it 
to LGBT rights.  Part II tells a detailed history of LGBT legal organizing in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  Rather than focus on specific cases or issues, this 
history proceeds by way of focusing on the organizations involved and how 
 
 1 See, e.g., DAVID BOIES & THEODORE B. OLSON, REDEEMING THE DREAM: THE CASE FOR 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 7 (2014); LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY 
REVOLUTION, at xiii (2012). 
 2 WALTER FRANK, LAW AND THE GAY RIGHTS STORY: THE LONG SEARCH FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 
IN A DIVIDED DEMOCRACY 1 (2014). 
 3 Mary C. Dunlap, Toward Recognition of “A Right to be Sexual,” 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 245, 245 
(1982).  The “right to be sexual” was first declared by Mary Dunlap in 1982.  Patricia A. Cain, “The 
Right to Be Sexual” (Revisited): Remembering Mary Dunlap, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 20 (2004). 
 4 Cf. Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, 93 SOCIALIST REV. 
9, 40 (1987) (describing difference and sameness models of gay identity). 
 5 See infra Part I (defining the right to be sexual). 
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the activists involved talked about their goals.  The right to be sexual 
overlapped with and competed with LGBT rights as a legal category to 
describe their goals.  This Article examines key litigation involving 
immigration, partner benefits, and prisons to show how the tension between 
LGBT rights and the right to be sexual played out doctrinally. 
Sodomy reform was a priority for all of the LGBT legal organizations 
when they were founded.  But it was not the only priority.  Part III turns to 
the history of sodomy reform, explaining how it became the defining goal of 
LGBT rights by the mid 1980s.  This Article argues that sodomy reform 
became a vehicle for talking about the larger meaning of the right to be 
sexual and LGBT rights.6  This part begins with a discussion of the sodomy 
roundtables.  It then turns to key pre-Hardwick sodomy litigation.  Part III 
concludes by reinterpreting some of the known history of Bowers v. Hardwick 
and adding in additional history that reveals more debate over legal strategies 
than is commonly recognized.  This Article’s theory of a right to be sexual 
sheds new light on the organizational disagreements over this case. 
In addition to a richer historical understanding of LGBT rights, this 
Article contributes to how we understand LGBT rights today.  Part IV argues 
that the right to be sexual remains a viable theory today.  This Article 
analyzes Supreme Court opinions on LGBT rights through the lens of the 
right to be sexual.  This analysis reveals how the Court has implicitly 
accepted central tenets of the right to be sexual.  Moreover, this Article 
argues that LGBT rights has only succeeded because the Court has implicitly 
accepted the right to be sexual. 
I.  DEFINING THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL 
The idea of LGBT rights is that LGBT people, as a group, deserve 
constitutional protection under principles of privacy and equal protection.  
According to this view, LGBT people do not threaten the basic institutions 
of society.  They are different from the majority only in a small and 
insignificant respect.  As critics note, LGBT rights are won at the cost of 
hiding sexuality itself.7  LGBT people are protected as a group, but on 
 
 6 Similarly, with reference to same-sex marriage today, Doug NeJaime refers to same-sex marriage’s 
role in a broader movement as “talking around marriage.” See Douglas NeJaime, Introduction: Talking 
Around Marriage, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 675, 679 (2012) (“Marriage did not define and structure the 
dialogue around sexuality and gender.  Rather, it provided a lens for analysis and often receded 
into the background.”). 
 7 See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS, at xi (2006) 
(arguing that lesbians and gays need to “cover” their sexuality in order to win protection from 
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condition that they do not talk about their sexual conduct or fundamentally 
challenge the state in any way.  In contrast, the right to be sexual foregrounds 
sexuality.  It claims protection from state regulation based on the dignity of 
sexual choices and sexual identities.  It deemphasizes individual identities, 
focusing on the claim that all sexual choices deserve the same dignity and 
respect.  The state can regulate sexual violence and lack of consent, but its 
justifications cannot be about the dignity or morality of sexual conduct.  The 
right to be sexual fundamentally challenges the state to recognize the dignity 
of all people.  
Mary Dunlap, a respected lesbian feminist lawyer and legal scholar in the 
early LGBT movement, first defined the right to be sexual as “the idea that 
an individual’s sexual choices are basic.”8  She set out to define “the right to 
be actively sexual for its own sake”9 and “a positive concept of sexual 
relationships.”10  For Dunlap, the right to be sexual was grounded in respect 
of the dignity of individual moral choices.11  Dunlap argued that if LGBT 
activists limited themselves to the doctrinal categories of privacy and 
equality—the standard bases of LGBT rights—they would unnecessarily 
limit the right to be sexual.12  To illustrate her concerns, she used examples 
of an elderly woman ejected from a nursing home for her “persistent 
association” with a male resident and a white girl expelled from a private 
 
discrimination); see also URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND 
LESBIAN LIBERATION 4 (1995) (arguing that gay and lesbian people have “virtual equality,” 
meaning they “possess some of the trappings of full equality but are denied all of its benefits”). 
 8 Dunlap, supra note 3, at 247.  Dunlap and many of her colleagues consciously drew on a sex-positive 
feminism that took challenging society’s sex-negativity as a core part of its goal.  Cf. Patricia A. 
Cain, “The Right to Be Sexual” (Revisited): Remembering Mary Dunlap, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 19 
(2004). 
 9 Annamay T. Sheppard, Unspoken Premises in Custody Litigation, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 229, 231 
(1982) (citing Dunlap, supra note 3, at 245). 
 10 Cain, supra note 8, at 21–23 (explaining that since “the Court never developed a positive concept 
of sexual relationships,” and has instead focused on the right to privacy, Dunlap “argue[d] that the 
privacy decisions imply there is a constitutionally protected ‘right to be sexual.’”). 
 11 See Mary C. Dunlap, In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1985, Michael J. Bowers, 
Petitioner, v. Michael Hardwick, et al., Respondents. Brief Amicus Curiae For the Lesbian Rights Project, 
Women’s Legal Defense Fund, Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. and the National Women’s Law Center., 14 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 949, 950 (1986) (explaining that the amicus brief filed with the Supreme 
Court in Bowers v. Hardwick written on behalf of the Lesbian Rights Project and other women’s rights 
organizations deliberately argued for the dignity of lesbian and gay sex); see also Brief for Lesbian 
Rights Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
168 (1986) (No. 85-140) (emphasizing “the citizens’ capacities for responsible individual judgment 
in the area of consenting adult sexual behavior”). 
 12 See Dunlap, supra note 3, at 247 (describing the right to be sexual as crabbed and inconsistent if 
advanced under the doctrine of privacy). 
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school for holding hands with a black male friend.13  Dunlap argued that, 
rather than shoehorn these examples into standard doctrinal categories of 
due process and equal protection, LGBT lawyers should develop the right to 
be sexual as a more persuasive basis for addressing the state’s fear of the open 
expression of sexuality. 
Other lawyers and activists writing at the same time and in the same 
circles as Dunlap also rejected the exclusive focus on LGBT people as the 
group affected by a right to be sexual.  They offered various criteria, 
including “the multiplicity of situations in which a person’s sexual orientation 
interfaces with the law[,]”14 the male/female dichotomy,15 and laws targeting 
“reproductive biology.”16  From these various starting points, they argued 
that “a strong affirmative interest in sexual expression and relationships” can 
be found in “our constitutional visions of liberty and equality.”17  Many of 
these scholars and activists were forthright in acknowledging that they were 
experimenting with new legal theories and claims.  While they discussed 
equality, they argued that it had to move beyond tests of formal classifications 
to recognize concerns with how the state regulated self-determination.18  Any 
form of LGBT rights that required sexual minorities to pretend to be just like 
heterosexuals in order to win legal protections could not constitute a real 
affirmation of the right to be sexual.19 
 
 13 Id. at 245 (citing Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903, 906, 908 (D. Conn. 1979) and Fiedler v. 
Marumsco Baptist Church, 486 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev’d sub nom. Fielder v. Marumsco 
Christian School, 631 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1980)).  Dunlap similarly stressed this intersectionality in 
her earlier work.  See Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the 
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1147 (1979) (“An essential commonality exists 
among the distinct groups—women, homosexuals, mothers of illegitimate children, sexually 
reassigned persons, and others—who have suffered from the power of the law to prescribe sex 
identity . . . .”). 
 14 Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799 (1979).  For further analysis on legal discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, see Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties Part I, 
10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459 (1985); Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-
Eighties Part II,1 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275 (1986); Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual 
Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1980–1981). 
 15 See Dunlap, supra note 3, at 247 (explaining that the right to be sexual may inhibit the sexual freedom 
of females if it is derived from a stereotypical dichotomous model of sexuality).  
 16 See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1008–9 (1984) (proposing 
a particular level of scrutiny for laws that govern reproductive biology). 
 17 Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WISC. L. REV. 187, 225, 228 (1988). 
 18 See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 806 (1990) (“[F]eminist 
theory will be better served if we refocus our energy from the debate about equality to a more direct 
debate about the meaning of self-definition.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907, 908 (1986) (“[The client] is forced to deny any pride in her 
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Like Dunlap, I define the right to be sexual as broader than just the right 
to be left alone.  It is different in its justification and in the demands it places 
on the state.  While the justification for the right to be left alone might be 
described as tolerance, the right to be sexual is justified by respect for the 
dignity of sexual identities and sexual choices. 20  This is a dignity that inheres 
in the person, not one that is conferred by the State.21  It is a dignity that the 
state can recognize but not one that the state can create.   
The right to privacy demands just that the state not interfere with what 
people do in their bedrooms.  It prevents government imposition of harm.  
The right to be sexual prevents the government from using sexuality to define 
a class for disability or stigma.  It demands positive state action to integrate 
sexual minorities into society.  This demand might include 
nondiscrimination and affirmative action laws and policies; healthcare 
benefits and medical research; support services for LGBT youth; and 
changed immigration policies.   
By arguing that the right to be sexual was a viable alternative to LGBT 
rights, I do not mean to argue that LGBT activists chose freely between these 
theories.  Because minority rights in the United States developed to protect 
blacks, other minority groups—including lesbians and gays—fared better 
when they seemed analogous to blacks.22  Thus, gays and lesbians could claim 
to be an oppressed minority group—defined by their sexuality rather than 
their race—who were seeking access to the same rights that everyone else 
enjoyed.23  The right to be sexual did not match this identity-based model of 
minority rights.  By arguing that the right to be sexual was a viable alternative 
to LGBT rights, I mean to broaden the discussion of what constitutes LGBT 
law.  LGBT legal organizations did not only think in terms of the narrow 
 
lesbianism, any solidarity with other lesbians; she may even be compelled to deny or alter her sexual 
relationship.”). 
 20 See Cain, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining that Dunlap’s amicus brief in Hardwick argued that love is a 
moral choice, rejecting the traditional arguments that focused on geographical privacy). 
 21 In United States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy describes marriage laws as a mechanism in which the 
state confers dignity on a couple.  570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013).  Noa Ben-Asher has described the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Windsor as a “weak dignity” because it assumes that the state confers 
dignity rather than seeing dignity as inherent in all people.  Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The 
Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 243–44 (2014).  However, the 
broader discussion of dignity in Windsor suggests that Justice Kennedy would be sympathetic to the 
argument that the dignity of sexual choice and identity is inherent in the person. 
 22 See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 314–15 (2002) (arguing that 
LGBT rights faced a challenge insofar as lesbians and gays were not seen as similar to racial 
minorities). 
 23 See Craig J. Konnoth, Note, Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation in the 
1950s–1970s, 119 YALE L.J. 316, 340–41 (2009) (discussing how gay activists introduced a race-
sexuality analogy in the courts). 
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identity-based claims of minority rights.  They also actively pursued the right 
to be sexual.  Even as LGBT rights became the dominant model, the right to 
be sexual continued to inform the strategic debates within the LGBT legal 
organizations.  Recovering this history of how the right to be sexual 
overlapped with and competed with LGBT rights as a basis for articulating 
arguments of liberty and equality is important to analyzing persistent 
questions of whether we protect sexual minorities because they are just like 
everyone else or because we respect some sphere of dignity around sexual 
choices.24 
II.  TRACING THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL IN EARLY LGBT LEGAL 
ORGANIZING 
Historical scholarship on LGBT rights addresses three overlapping 
themes:  Judicial treatment of LGBT rights, civil rights as a model for LGBT 
rights, and social movement histories of LGBT rights.  This scholarship is 
dominated by court-focused histories.  The identity-based logic of LGBT 
rights is obvious in the titles of key historical scholarship:  Gaylaw,25 Litigating 
for Lesbian and Gay Rights,26 Rainbow Rights,27 Queers in Court,28 Gay Rights and 
American Law,29 Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. The Supreme Court,30 From 
the Closet to the Courtroom: Five LGBT Rights Lawsuits that Have Changed Our 
Nation.31  This scholarship traces the history of LGBT rights from early 
procedural challenges to police harassment, through constitutional 
challenges to sodomy laws, and to more robust claims for equal protection 
under the law.  LGBT rights is defined by the demand to be left alone by the 
state and by the claim that LGBT people are just like everyone else.  These 
studies provide several different explanations for the changing meaning of 
LGBT rights.  These explanations include cultural attitudes towards LGBT 
 
 24 Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles 
over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474–75 (2004) (outlining similar persistent tensions in the 
justification for protection of racial minorities). 
 25   WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999).  
26  Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993). 
 27  PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN 
AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000).  
 28  SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, QUEERS IN COURT: GAY RIGHTS LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (2007).  
 29  DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW (2003).  
 
30  JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME 
COURT (2001).  
 31 CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS LAWSUITS 
THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION (2010).  But see MARC STEIN, SEXUAL INJUSTICE: 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD TO ROE 57–93 (2010) (analyzing Boutilier v. INS 
through lens of Supreme Court cases dealing with sexual freedom and equality). 
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people,32 judicial politics,33 the roles of individual lawyers and plaintiffs,34 and 
broader changes in legal doctrine on privacy and equal protection.35 
Along the way, these court-focused studies discuss some disagreements 
over the meaning of LGBT rights.  In particular, they highlight the recurring 
argument raised by some LGBT rights lawyers that it is important to talk 
about real LGBT people in court.36  These lawyers were concerned that 
when legal arguments were just about the abstract categories of privacy and 
equal protection, the dignity of actual LGBT people disappeared.37  These 
dignitary concerns are related to the issues that I raise in this Article.  
However, in current historical scholarship, they are treated as discrete 
strategic debates:  Should LGBT lawyers talk just about privacy or talk also 
about the people impacted by privacy laws?38  This Article shows that these 
disagreements were more than strategic issues.  These disagreements are 
related to the unresolved tensions between protecting people based on the 
right to be sexual and LGBT rights. 
Several key studies also focus on individual cases, revealing the particular 
historical context leading up to the case and influencing its outcome.  Dale 
Carpenter finds that Lawrence v. Texas depended upon an almost unbelievable 
cast of characters, including local police in Texas and a politically-sensitive 
bartender, to transform what could have been routine police harassment of 
gay men into a major constitutional challenge.39  Carpenter shows how the 
constitutional case was shaped by local and national politics.  Similarly, Lisa 
Keen and Suzanne Goldberg discuss how local lawyers in Colorado thought 
about the challenge in Romer v. Evans in different terms from national lawyers 
 
 32 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 2–4 (describing cultural construction of homosexuality as 
underlying legal regulation of lesbians and gays). 
 33 See PINELLO, supra note 29, at 72-105 (explaining court decisions based on judicial attitudes model). 
 34 For detailed studies of individual cases and the roles of individual actors in those cases, see BALL, 
supra note 31; MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 30. 
 35 See Konnoth, supra note 23, at 352–57 (discussing changes in the doctrinal approach to analyzing 
minority groups). 
 36 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 
1861-2003 138 (2008) (describing how Frank Kameny utilized politics of recognition to advocate 
for the decriminalization of sodomy laws).   
 37 See Cain, supra note 26, at 1591–1611 (illustrating how early sodomy cases led LGBT litigators to 
argue that gay identity/status was distinct from sodomy); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: 
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 
1639–44 (1997) (comparing LGBT rights litigation that directly challenged the regulation of 
conduct with litigation that implicitly accepted regulation of conduct in order to argue for 
discrimination based on identity). 
 38 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 154–55 (discussing first federal challenge to sodomy laws under 
privacy theory). 
 39 See generally DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012) 
(describing the legal strategy used by Lambda Legal attorneys). 
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from the LGBT legal organizations.40  These studies are presented as adding 
more nuance to specific chapters of LGBT rights.  They do not change the 
overall focus of the story from LGBT rights. 
A second theme in this historical scholarship is the role of the civil rights 
movement as a model for LGBT rights.  In most studies, this is more of an 
assumption than a major part of the analysis.41  Studies mention the civil 
rights movement as a model but do not develop the alleged links.42  The civil 
rights movement is assumed to provide organizational models for LGBT 
organizations, public recognition of the idea of the public interest lawyer, and 
direct precedents that LGBT rights lawyers could use.43  When told through 
Hardwick, Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, and their analogies to Plessy, 
Cleburne, Reed, Brown, Griswold, and Loving, LGBT rights becomes an obvious 
extension of earlier civil rights.  The earlier civil rights and women’s rights 
cases offered a model of formal legal equality for LGBT lawyers.  The work 
of LGBT rights lawyers was to expand the established categories of civil 
rights.  This scholarship pays insufficient attention to how the arguments put 
forth by LGBT rights lawyers did not simply parallel the civil rights cases that 
they sometimes relied upon.44 
A third theme in the historical literature on LGBT rights is social 
movement studies.  Because these studies focus on street politics and direct 
action, they typically devote little attention to litigation.45  To the extent that 
social movement studies do discuss LGBT rights litigation, most assume that 
the development of LGBT legal organizations was an obvious response to 
 
 40 See LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 17–
42 (1998) (discussing tensions between local and national lawyers). 
 41 But see Konnoth, supra note 23, at 340-69 (providing an in-depth analysis of how lesbian and gay 
rights used civil rights precedents in the 1950s through 1970s). 
 42 See, e.g., MEZEY, supra note 28, at 2 (suggesting that lesbian and gay rights “[hewed] most closely to 
the civil rights model”). 
 43 See CAIN, supra note 27, at 49–53 (considering the tension and division that existed in civil rights 
movements prior to gay and lesbian civil rights and arguing those tensions and divisions were 
parallel to the ones faced by gay and lesbian civil rights); Konnoth, supra note 23, at 352–57 
(considering past precedent that influenced LGBT rights); Thomas Miguel Hilbink, Constructing 
Cause Lawyering: Professionalism, Politics, and Social Change in 1960’s America 346–53 (May 
2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author) (arguing that the 
civil rights movement produced an idea of the public interest lawyer as devoted to fair procedure 
and process). 
 44 See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 5 (2011) (“And reasoning from race did not only involve simple parallels or assertions 
of equivalence.  When advocates reasoned from race, they often engaged in more sophisticated uses 
of comparative analysis.”). 
 45 But see Katherine Turk, “Our Militancy is in Our Openness”: Gay Employment Rights Activism in California 
and the Question of Sexual Orientation in Sex Equality Law, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 423, 427 (2013) (finding 
that the same organizations engaged in direct action also sponsored key litigation in the 1960s). 
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the growth of an LGBT social movement.  One author claims that “the 
history of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund is in no short 
measure the history of gay rights litigation in the United States.”46  Another 
author describes Lambda as the “legal arm” of the gay movement, engaged 
in a conventional civil rights approach to LGBT rights modeled after other 
civil rights organizations.47  Social movement studies also commonly describe 
the turn to LGBT rights litigation as an assimilationist strategy.48  Like the 
other historical scholarship, social movement studies fail to address the 
diversity of early approaches to litigation by LGBT activists and lawyers. 
Turning to the contemporary organizational records, a different picture 
emerges.49  Beginning in the 1950s, LGBT organizations turned to litigation 
with a variety of different goals.  Some might be described as mainstream 
and assimilationist, but others were radical and liberationist.50  They did not 
all fit neatly under the rubric of LGBT rights as we know them today.  Even 
as they slowly moved towards the identity-based claims that would become 
the category of LGBT rights that we know today, their identity-based claims 
were heavily infused with demands for the dignity and autonomy of sexual 
conduct.  The right to be sexual was as important as LGBT rights in these 
early organizational goals.  Ultimately, I argue that the category of LGBT 
rights emerged as these organizations struggled to define what they do. 
The organizational approach that I use in this Article provides a new 
model for studying legal history.  A growing scholarship that has been called 
a “new civil rights history” deemphasizes the centrality of the Supreme 
Court.51  In her groundbreaking study of civil rights history, Tomiko Brown-
Nagin asks what civil rights would look like if we did not put the NAACP and 
 
 46 ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 27 (2005). 
 47 HIRSHMAN, supra note 1, at 148. 
 48 See, e.g., CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY 
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (2002) (describing the “assimilationist, legal-rights 
framework”). 
 49 For a full organizational history, see Jeffrey Kosbie, Contested Identities: A History of LGBT Legal 
Mobilization and the Ethics of Impact (June 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 
University) (on file with author).  
 50 Cf. Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 
4–5 (arguing that the earliest same-sex marriage litigation was embedded in a politics of gay 
liberation and not gay rights). 
 51 See Kenneth W. Mack, Civil Rights History: The Old and the New, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 258, 258 
(2013) (footnote omitted) (defining the new civil rights history as a paradigm in which “civil rights 
historians meld a traditional approach to the legal history of the subject . . . with that of traditional 
social history” to “show that civil rights law and lawyers were a mediating force . . . between the 
formal legal system and outsider communities”). 
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Thurgood Marshall at the center of the story.52  She argues that we need to 
include the more radical and more “pragmatic” civil rights strategies of 
lawyers in Atlanta to fully explain the spread of civil rights across the 
country.53  Risa Goluboff recovers a history of debates within the early 
NAACP over labor rights.54  Christopher Schmidt turns to the question of 
how lawyers and activists define the idea of law and its relation to society.55  
And “[putting] aside the segregation-to-integration narrative” of civil rights, 
Kenneth Mack focuses on the dilemmas of professional identity faced by 
black lawyers.56 
The new civil rights history challenges traditional legal history’s 
overreliance on legal doctrine.  Drawing on new sources of data, this 
scholarship analyzes how the meaning of rights varies across communities, 
racial and class boundaries, organizations, and time periods.  What emerges 
is a more complicated picture of how legal change happens.  The micro-
organizational perspective that I use in this Article contributes to the 
methodological tools of the new civil rights history.  This Article relies on 
internal records of the LGBT legal organizations, personal papers of lawyers, 
and interviews with the lawyers involved to reconstruct the debates over the 
right to be sexual.57  Paying attention to these organizational histories offers 
fresh insights into the different ways legal meanings are constructed and 
contested. 
 
 52 See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 2 (2012) (“When civil rights litigation was undertaken, pragmatism 
sometimes dictated different targets from those chosen by the NAACP and its legal arm, the 
NAACP LDF.”). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 217–37 (2007) (tracing debates 
leading to NAACP decision to drop labor issues). 
 55 Christopher W. Schmidt, Conceptions of Law in the Civil Rights Movement, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 641, 
643 (2011); see also Christopher W. Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sit-ins and the Role of the Courts in the 
Civil Rights Movement, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 93, 94 (2015) (explaining how the social protest 
movement influenced civil rights litigation). 
 56 KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
LAWYER 8 (2012).  Mack tells “a multiple biography of a group of African American lawyers . . . 
[ranging] from famous figures . . . [to those] who have been largely lost to history.”  Id. at 3–9. 
 57 Organizational records include Lambda Legal, the ACLU, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and 
Defenders, National Gay Rights Advocates, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and other 
organizations.  Records were accessed from 10 universities and archival repositories, the 
organizations themselves, and private papers of individual lawyers.  Over seventy interviews were 
completed with founders and key leaders of all the organizations.  For more details on the research, 
see Kosbie, supra note 49. 
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A.  Homophile Organizations 
Before the “modern” era of LGBT activism, lesbians and gays organized 
“homophile” organizations in the 1950s and 1960s.  Because their litigation 
was typically defensive—following a sodomy arrest or police raid—it was 
often characterized as cautious and conservative.58  But the turn to litigation 
in the homophile movement was about more than a demand to be left alone 
by the state.  It was also a demand for recognition of deviant sexualities.  Even 
when homophile activists moved closer to identity-based legal theories in the 
late 1960s, the dignity of sexual choices remained central to their legal 
theories. 
Shortly after it was founded in 1951, the Mattachine Society decided to 
defend one of its members after his arrest.  Dale Jennings was followed home 
from a popular gay cruising area by a plain-clothes police officer who 
practically demanded entry to his apartment.  Once inside, the officer 
arrested Jennings for lewd behavior.59  In an era when this type of police 
entrapment practice was common, the standard legal advice was to plead 
guilty and never to admit to being gay.60  Dale Jennings rejected this advice, 
admitting to his homosexuality in court and demanding a jury trial.61  In one 
sense, Jennings’ legal claims did not require any state respect for the dignity 
of sexual conduct.  Jennings formal arguments sounded in police misconduct, 
not dignity.  But given the social context, the decision to openly admit to 
being gay was a radical demand for recognition and respect. 
By the early 1960s, homophile activists increasingly turned to the law to 
fight police harassment and arrests in gay bars.62  A police raid on a 1964 
New Year’s Eve ball in San Francisco, hosted by the Council on Religion 
and the Homosexual, was one such turning point.  Despite previous promises 
 
 58 Cain, supra note 8, at 1558–64 (discussing litigation under the homophile movement).  See generally 
JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL 
MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940–1970 (2d ed. 1998) (detailing complete history of 
homophile movement). 
 59 D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 70–71. 
 60 See JOHN D’EMILIO, MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE 
UNIVERSITY 30–31 (1992) (describing Jennings arrest and typical practices at the time). 
 61 See id. at 31–32 (discussing Mattachine Society’s decision to fight Jennings arrest and legal tactics).  
Jennings’ trial began on June 23, 1952.  After a hung jury, the district attorney decided not to retry 
Jennings.  Id. at 33. 
 62 Following the Jennings’ trial, homophile activists largely retreated from the public sphere for the 
remainder of the decade.  See id. at 37–52 (reviewing turn to less confrontational politics).  But see 
D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 115 (discussing One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam) 
(reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the Postmaster of Los Angeles, California properly 
refused to transmit a homosexual magazine because it was obscene, lewd, lascivious and filthy), rev’g 
241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957)).  
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to leave the ball alone, police turned up in force, photographing and 
intimidating the guests.63  After the lawyers, who were there as observers, 
asked for a warrant before allowing the police to enter, the police arrested 
the lawyers.64  The ball took place in The Tenderloin, a San Francisco 
neighborhood that the police considered to be home to homosexuals, 
prostitutes, drag queens, and other alleged perverts.  After the ACLU helped 
the lawyers fight the criminal charges, the lawyers filed their own civil suit 
against the city alleging violation of their civil rights.65  CRH used the lawsuit 
to raise publicity about police harassment and to challenge the 
characterization of lesbians and gays as sexual perverts.66  Other homophile 
organizations formed legal committees and incorporated litigation into other 
work on police harassment,67 immigration exclusions,68 criminal law 
reform,69 and federal government employment practices.70 
On August 29, 1956, Frank Kameny was arrested after undercover police 
observed another man fondling Kameny’s genitals in a San Francisco 
restroom.71  Kameny pleaded guilty, paid his fine and served his probation, 
and thought that the incident was resolved.  But in December 1957, Kameny 
was dismissed from his job at the U.S. Army Map Service after they learned 
of his earlier arrest.72  Kameny fought his dismissal all the way to the 
 
 63 D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 193–94. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Letter from Marshall Krause, ACLU staff lawyer, to Morris Lowenthal (May 19, 1965) (on file 
with San Francisco Public Library, Evander Smith Papers). 
 66 D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 193–94; ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS 1945–1990: AN ORAL HISTORY 147–65 (1992) (interviews 
with lawyers). 
 67 See Pearl Hart, Know Your Rights (1965) (unpublished brochure written for Mattachine Society) 
(on file with author). 
 68 See D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 197 (discussing the establishment of the North American Conference 
of Homophile Organizations, which funded court cases that dealt with, inter alia, the exclusion of 
homosexual immigrants). 
 69 The North American Conference of Homophile Organizations (“NACHO") formed a Committee 
on Legal Affairs primarily to reform criminal law with regard to homosexuality.   Letter from 
Franklin E. Kameny to Austin Wade (May 23, 1969) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton 
University, Arthur Warner Papers).  For more information regarding how NACHO delegated 
homophile initiatives between committees, see id.; Letter from Austin Wade to Franklin E. Kameny 
(Apr. 28, 1969) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Arthur Warner Papers).    
 70 See Kameny v. Brucker, 282 F.2d 823, 823–24 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (challenging the 
appellant’s removal from the Army Map Service, an agency of the U.S. Department of Defense). 
 71 FRANKLIN E. KAMENY, PETITION DENIED, REVOLUTION BEGUN: THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF 
KAMENY AT THE COURT: FRANK KAMENY’S PETITION TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 5 (Charles Francis, ed. 2011) (ebook). 
 72 D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 151. 
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Supreme Court, filing a pro se certiorari petition in 1961.73  In his petition, 
Kameny argued that exclusion from government employment “makes of the 
homosexual a second-rate citizen, by discriminating against him without 
reasonable cause.”74 According to Bill Eskridge, Kameny’s argument was 
important because it ‘went beyond the liberal politics of privacy’ and made 
an identity-based claim for equality.75  But it was an identity-based claim that 
was still infused with sexuality:  “[F]or those choosing voluntarily to engage 
in homosexual acts, such acts are moral in a real and positive sense[.]”76 
Following the denial of certiorari in his case, Kameny helped found the 
Mattachine Society of Washington and a local affiliate of the ACLU, the 
National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union.77  Kameny aggressively 
pursued legal reform, representing dozens of lesbians and gays dismissed 
from the military and other government employment in various 
administrative hearings.78  While Kameny was not a lawyer himself, he 
compiled records of how the government singled out gay sexual conduct.  
When other lawyers criticized Kameny’s failure to emphasize the traditional 
theories of administrative law, Kameny responded that most lawyers were 
ill-equipped to describe the discrimination faced by lesbians and gays.79  
Kameny’s response is important because it shows how he refused to accept 
the idea that a turn to litigation had to mean dropping claims of sexuality.  
For Kameny, the turn to litigation could be bold and confrontational, 
especially when used to demand equality. 
 
 73 Initially, former California Congressman Byron N. Scott represented Kameny, filing a complaint 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and appealing the district court’s decision to 
the U.S Court of Appeals.  However, after losing in the Court of Appeals, Scott decided not to 
represent Kameny in his appeal to the Supreme Court.  Instead, Scott provided Kameny with a 
sample Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and the Supreme Court rules so that Kameny could appeal 
to the Supreme Court on his own.  Charles Francis, Introduction to KAMENY, supra note 71, at 2–3. 
 74 ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 137. 
 75 Id. at 137–38. 
 76 KAMENY, supra note 71, at 8.  
 77 D’EMILIO, supra note 58, at 152, 155. 
 78 See id. at 152–53 (discussing Kameny’s activism); see also Letter from Alan Reitman to Frank 
Kameny (July 1962) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, ACLU Papers) (responding 
to Kameny’s criticisms of ACLU policy); letter from Frank Kameny to ACLU (Nov. 7, 1964) (on 
file with Library of Congress, Kameny Papers) (outlining police harassment in gay bars); Letter 
from Frank Kameny to ACLU (May 1966) (on file with Library of Congress, Kameny Papers) 
(debating protections for government employees); Kameny Files, Library of Congress, containers 
12-39 (records of Kameny’s representation of individuals in front of government agencies). 
 79 See Letter from Frank E. Kameny to Austin Wade, supra note 69 (“For example, my remarks 
notwithstanding, I do not really dislike or look down upon lawyers; I just do not look up to them as 
a class or group, and I feel that they need badly to be de-deified.”). 
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B.  National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties 
Founded in 1970 by Arthur Warner “from the debris of the old NACHO 
legal committee,” the National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties 
(“NCSCL”) set legal reform as its explicit goal.80  This first attempt at 
building a permanent legal organization, largely forgotten today, represents 
a different vision of sexual civil liberties.  NCSCL rejected the idea that there 
are gay or straight issues, instead defining its legal reform agenda broadly as 
including adultery, prostitution, solicitation, lewdness, and sodomy laws.81  
Among its major litigation victories of the 1970s, it listed cases involving lewd 
conduct, employment discrimination, prostitution, loitering for sexual 
conduct, and sodomy.82 
In addition to its rejection of the identity model, NCSCL differed from 
modern LGBT legal organizations in its structure.  Records describe a year-
long review process for proposed new members.83  NCSCL functioned as a 
coalition, bringing together an “elite” group of lawyers and academics for 
annual meetings to discuss sexual civil liberties.84  While interviewees 
describe the process of adding new members as more informal, they agree 
that Arthur Warner had to personally approve any new members.85 
Despite its legal orientation, the majority of NCSCL members were 
always non-lawyers and Arthur Warner himself was not licensed to practice 
law.86  It described its primary mission as “the pursuit of sexual civil liberties 
through education, both public and within the executive, legislative, judicial, 
and administrative branches of government.”87  One of the key ways that 
NCSCL carried this mission out was through the publication of the Sexual 
 
 80 See Advisory Letter on NCSCL (no date) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner 
Papers). 
 81 See NCSCL Legal Report (1982) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner Papers) 
(“there are no ‘gay’ issues, there are no ‘straight’ issues, there are only sexual issues”). 
 82 See id. (citing Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Pryor v. Municipal Court, 
599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979); Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 
1979); People v. Norris, 152 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1978); People v. Gibson, 
521 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1974)). 
 83 See NCSCL Legal Report, supra note 81. 
84  Kosbie, supra note 49, at 107 (explaining that NCSCL functioned as a think tank and often held its 
annual meeting in the same place as the American Bar Association). 
 85 Interview with Tom Coleman, former legal counsel, NCSCL, in L.A., Cal. (Aug. 26, 2013).  
Interviewees also noted a concern with infiltration by the police.  Interview with Jay Kohorn, former 
legal counsel, NCSCL, in L.A., Cal. (Aug. 28, 2013). 
 86 One interviewee suggested that Warner’s commitment to sexual civil liberties might have resulted 
from being denied access to the bar himself for an arrest.  Interview with Jay Kohorn, supra note 85. 
 87 NCSCL Fact Sheet (no date) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner Papers). 
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Law Reporter.  First published in 1975, the Reporter’s coverage matched the 
breadth of NCSCL’s own mission. 
NCSCL’s broad theory of sexual liberties carried through to the doctrinal 
arguments that it made in court.  Sodomy laws were objectionable on more 
than just privacy grounds.  Privacy would not reach NCSCL’s concern with 
laws against prostitution, solicitation, and adultery.  For example, in an early 
major case, NCSCL’s brief argued that sodomy “statutes exist primarily to 
punish, harass and otherwise denigrate the male homosexual, to make him 
feel inferior, unworthy, and an outlaw of society.”88  The brief continued to 
explain that sodomy laws prevent homosexuals from fulfilling their full sex 
drive.  It claimed violation of equal protection based on denying homosexuals 
the only avenue to sexual satisfaction open to them.89  This theory of equal 
protection, based upon sexual conduct rather than identity, is truly unique 
and reflects NCSCL’s rejection of traditional identity politics.  Even the 
decision to highlight the connection between sexual conduct and dignity, 
which LGBT legal groups would embrace decades later in a very different 
context in Lawrence v. Texas, was radical for the time.90  
Whereas LGBT legal groups are sometimes accused of hiding sexuality, 
NCSCL very explicitly made a point of highlighting sexuality.  It is easy to 
dismiss this as a failed and forgotten style of organizing.  By the early 1980s 
NCSCL was beginning to fade as the present LGBT legal organizations grew 
in size and strength.91  Its non-identarian organization model was eclipsed by 
the new LGBT organizations.  Lawyers organized in their own circles, rather 
than through NCSCL.  But NCSCL’s emphasis on a broad understanding 
of sexual civil liberties did impact how we think about sodomy and the 
eventual meaning of LGBT rights. 
C.  National Gay Task Force 
Founded in 1973 as the first national gay rights political organization, the 
National Gay Task Force (“NGTF”) played an active role in litigation into 
 
 88 Motion of N. Am. Conference of Homophile Orgs. for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae & Brief 
Amicus Curiae at 3, Buchanan v. Wade, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) (No. 290).  This brief was filed under 
NACHO’s name by Walter Barnett, one of the key early leaders of NCSCL, and NCSCL claims 
credit for working on Buchanan. 
 89 Id. at 4–5. 
 90 See Amicus Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al. in Support of Petitioners at 16, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (“Laws that brand gay people as criminally deviant do not 
operate on some abstract ‘class.’  They harm real men and women . . . .”). 
 91 Interview with Tom Coleman, supra note 85. 
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the early 1980s.92  The NGTF example is particularly important because it 
challenges the idea that we should exclusively focus on the litigation-oriented 
organizations to tell the history of LGBT rights.93  When we focus only on 
litigation-oriented organizations, we can see the work happening in one 
direction:  They shape the stories that they tell in court to fit the doctrinal 
categories that they work with.  When we expand our story to include actors 
like NGTF, we see how they started with the experiences of people on the 
ground and shaped legal claims around that.  The right to be sexual plays a 
larger role in this story of the origins of LGBT rights.  As we expand the 
actors that we include in this history, we see a broader set of debates over 
what would become LGBT rights.   
NGTF adopted the LGBT-identity model that we are familiar with 
today.  They built networks at the local and state levels, giving them access 
to lesbian and gay people in local communities across far more of the United 
States than the legal organizations at the time.94  When NGTF learned of 
cases of discrimination, it often played a key role in connecting LGBT people 
to lawyers who could represent them.95  NGTF also served as a plaintiff in 
several cases.  For example, NGTF coordinated its efforts with Lambda 
Legal in developing a challenge to the Federal Bureau of Prison’s treatment 
of gay prisoners.96  In 1977, Lambda filed the litigation with NGTF as 
plaintiff, challenging the prohibition of gay publications to prisoners.97  
NGTF also played a key role in orchestrating an eventual Supreme Court 
challenge to bans on gay teachers.  In 1978, Oklahoma passed a law modeled 
after the Briggs Initiative in California.98  The statute allowed the state to 
 
 92 NGTF later changed its name to The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and then to 
The National LGBTQ Task Force.  It is often referred to simply as “The Task Force.” 
 93 Cf. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Long, Broad, and Deep Civil Rights Movement: The Lessons of a Master Scholar 
and Teacher, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY 140, 150–55 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R. B. Bernstein eds., 
2013) (describing how her understanding of “accommodationist” civil rights strategies shifted when 
she studied lawyers outside the NAACP). 
 94 John D’Emilio, Organizational Tales: Interpreting the NGLTF Story, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 469, 473 (John D’Emilio, William B. Turner & Urvashi Vaid 
eds., 2000). 
 95 See Letter from NGTF to NGTF Members (Mar. 23, 1981) (on file with Cornell University Library, 
NGTF Files) (soliciting NGTF members who are teachers in Oklahoma to participate in NGTF v. 
Oklahoma).  Other records in this archival collection discuss this and other cases. 
 96 In 1980, the Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund announced in its newsletter that the Bureau 
of Prisons had “agreed to admit gay publications into federal prisons” under the settlement of NGTF 
v. Carlson.  For further discussion of the settlement, see Federal Bureau of Prisons Agrees to Admit Gay 
Publications, NEWS FROM LAMBDA (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., New York, NY), 
Fall/Winter 1980, at 1.  
97      Id.  
98      Kosbie, supra note 49, at 127. 
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dismiss public school teachers for engaging in or advocating “public 
homosexual activity.”99  Using its networks, NGTF reached out to teachers 
in Oklahoma who wanted to challenge the law.100  When it could not find 
teachers willing to publicly put their name on a lawsuit for fear of reprisal, 
NGTF became the plaintiff in a challenge to the law.101  NGTF provided 
sworn affidavits that it represented the interests of its members who were 
teachers in Oklahoma and had a real risk of being dismissed under this law.102  
Working with NGRA and the ACLU, NGTF helped design the legal theories 
in the challenge.103 
While National Gay Rights Advocates (“GRA”) and the ACLU provided 
the litigation expertise, NGTF itself initiated the lawsuit.104  NGTF played a 
key role in identifying plaintiffs and developing the legal theories used in the 
case.105  NGTF also reached out to the National Organization for Women, 
the National Educational Association, and other groups, asking them to join 
as amici or parties to the lawsuit.106  The Tenth Circuit held that the portion 
of the law prohibiting advocacy of homosexual activity was 
unconstitutionally vague,107 and the Supreme Court split 4-4 leaving the 
ruling in place.108 
In 1980, NGTF proposed a formal affiliation with a legal organization.  
NGTF’s board expressed the goal of “creat[ing] a national capability to 
coordinate the key functions of advocacy, litigation, and public education, 
with a view towards developing effective strategies to secure the legal rights 
and human dignity of lesbians and gay men.”109  While NGTF had good 
relationships with the legal organizations at the time, board members raised 
the concern that NGTF’s growing legal agenda demanded a more formal 
relationship with a legal organization.110  Potential models for affiliation 
 
 99 Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 1984). 
100    Kosbie, supra note 49, at 131. 
101  Id. at 130. 
102  Id. at 131. 
103  Id. at 128–32.  
 104 See Helms Memo (June 18, 1980) (on file with Cornell University Library, NGTF Files) (describing 
NGTF’s early organizing against Oklahoma statute). 
105  Kosbie, supra note 49, at 127-32. 
106  Id. at 130 
 107 Nat’l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274. 
 108 Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Nat’l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per curiam).  Justice 
Powell took no part in the decision.  Id.   
 109 See NGTF Board Resolution (Aug. 3, 1980) (on file with Cornell University Library, NGTF Papers) 
[hereinafter NGTF August Resolution]; NGRA Board Resolution (Jul. 12, 1980) (on file with 
Cornell University Library, NGTF Papers) [hereinafter NGTF July Resolution] (using nearly 
identical language). 
 110 See NGTF August Resolution, supra note 109. 
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ranged from a formal advisory relationship to full merger.111  After all the 
legal organizations at the time responded to its proposal, NGTF entered 
serious merger discussions with GRA.112  The proposed merger ultimately 
failed, but it is important because it suggests a different way of doing LGBT 
rights. 
D.  The New LGBT Legal Organizations 
When the major LGBT legal organizations were founded in the 1970s, 
they marked something new.  It was the first time that litigation-oriented 
organizations openly dedicated themselves to protecting lesbian and gay 
people.  But what did it mean to litigate on behalf of lesbian and gay rights?  
The new LGBT legal organizations drew on existing models of public 
interest legal organizations as they defined their own organizational 
identities, or sense of “who we are” and “what we do.”113  But these 
organizations also experimented with different legal theories and different 
ideas about what it meant to represent LGBT people.114  By paying close 
attention to how these new organizations defined their work, I argue that we 
get more insight into how the right to be sexual was intertwined with LGBT 
rights as LGBT rights emerged as a category. 
In the early 1970s, Bill Thom responded to a request for legal aid from 
the Gay Activists Alliance (“GAA”) in New York City.  As a lawyer at a mid-
size firm in the city, Thom was on track to become a partner and was not out 
at work.  Thom explained that he initially ignored the request, sent to all 
lawyers subscribed to a bar association list for legal aid requests, but 
 
 111 See id. 
 112 While the board resolutions from NGTF and NGRA confirm the seriousness of the proposal, no 
one that I interviewed remembers it.  This suggests that NGTF did not entertain the possibility of 
a merger for long after the initial proposal failed. 
 113 See generally Stephen M. Engel, Organizational Identity as a Constraint on Strategic Action: A Comparative 
Analysis of Gay and Lesbian Interest Groups, 21 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 66 (2007) (describing and 
comparing the organizational structures and advocacy choices of several prominent LGBT interest 
groups in the 1990s).  Organizational identity includes an organization’s membership 
demographics, internal self-view, and its external reputation.  Id. at 67–68.  Identity helps establish 
an organization’s niche in a broader field.  Id.  The identities of the LGBT legal organizations were 
shaped by the availability of a model of public interest legal organizations.  See id.  at 75–81 
(providing a historical overview of two nationally prominent gay and lesbian interest groups and 
describing their models for success).  Beginning in 1969, the number of public interest legal 
organizations expanded rapidly, creating a public recognition of the idea of a “public interest” law 
firm.  Hilbink, supra note 43, at 317; see also Ann Southworth, What is Public Interest Law? Empirical 
Perspectives on an Old Question, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495 (2013) (tracing continued expansion of 
use of “public interest” label). 
 114 I do not include the ACLU in my discussion, but it also played a key role in developing LGBT legal 
field.  See Kosbie, supra note 49, at 182–225 (explaining the ACLU’s involvement in LGBT rights). 
August 2020] THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL 1409 
responded several months later when the request was still open.  After seeing 
how the Fordham law student in charge of the GAA legal committee 
struggled to run the committee, Thom decided to found a gay legal defense 
and education fund.115  He chose the name “Lambda” because it was already 
associated with LGBT culture, but would not raise the same attention from 
outsiders as a name that included “Gay” or “Lesbian.”116  Nonetheless facing 
criticism from his law firm, Bill Thom resigned and later opened his own law 
firm with Cary Boggan.117  In the early years of the organization, Lambda 
operated out of a board member’s living room and later out of Boggan and 
Thom’s law offices.  At monthly board meetings (the board was the entirety 
of the organization), members debated how to best respond to incoming 
requests for aid. 
Lambda Legal most directly followed the public interest legal model from 
when it was first founded.  Bill Thom copied its charter application from the 
Puerto Rican Education and Defense Legal Fund, the most recently founded 
legal fund in New York City prior to Lambda.118  Even in 1977, Lambda’s 
newsletter talked about the importance of “test case litigation” to Lambda’s 
mission.119  These early newsletters defined its mission in terms of 
discrimination “perpetuated by the American legal system.”120 
Lambda also moved to secure its identity as representing the full LGBT 
community.  Although Bill Thom initially chose the name Lambda because 
it avoided the higher profile of the words Gay or Lesbian, by 1980 Lambda 
was readily recognized as a gay organization.121  In 1980, Lambda 
announced that it had just hired a new national board of directors.122  And 
in 1983, Lambda broadened its litigation priorities to include family and 
relationships (issues more important to lesbians at the time) and the first 
AIDS discrimination case in the nation.123 
 
 115 Interview with Bill Thom, Founder of Lambda Legal, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Sept. 11, 2013). 
 116    Id. 
 117 Id.  Shepherd Raimi explains that, after starting Lambda, the partners at Thom’s firm told him that 
if he were to run Lambda Legal, he would not have the time required to make partner. Interview 
with Shepherd Raimi, Original Board Member of Lambda Legal, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Sept. 14, 2013). 
 118 Interview with Bill Thom, supra note 115. 
 119 See Counseling, 2 LAMBDA NEWS 1, 2 (Apr. 1977) (“Test case litigation or other matters likely to affect 
gay people as a group is the function for which Lambda was created . . . .”). 
 120 Purpose, LAMBDA: NEWS FROM LAMBDA LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC. (Lambda Legal Def. & 
Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Sept./Oct. 1979, at 2. 
 121 Interview with Bill Thom, supra note 115. 
 122 Lambda Elects New National Board of Directors, NEWS FROM LAMBDA, supra note 96, at 1, 3. 
 123 Lambda Fights the First AIDS Lawsuit to Reach Court, LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1983, at 1–2; Lambda Adopts New Priority, LAMBDA UPDATE, supra, 
at 2.      
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The founding story of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders 
(“GLAD”) is more radical but similarly starts with one person.  In 1977, John 
Ward opened his law office in Boston and began advertising in Gay Community 
News as a lawyer serving the gay community.124  He explained that he was 
the first openly gay male lawyer in Boston.125  After a series of arrests of gay 
men for lewd conduct at the Boston Public Library, Ward decided to open 
GLAD in 1978.126  Ward’s connections with Gay Community News played a key 
role in shaping GLAD.  Most of the early board members and staff of GLAD 
came from Gay Community News, which had a reputation for radical politics, 
even with the gay community.127  GLAD’s board and staff shared this radical 
politics.  To GLAD, defending gay men arrested in sex stings was not simply 
a matter of demanding to be left alone by the police; it was also a demand 
for the state to reorganize police practices to protect lesbians and gays.  Early 
newsletters defined their goal as defending cases “in our own words” in 
court.128 
GLAD did not start out as explicitly focused on impact litigation.  Instead, 
it grew out of John Ward’s defense of individual gay men arrested in sex 
stings in Boston.129  But as the organization grew, it increasingly defined itself 
in similar terms of impact litigation on behalf of the LGBT community.  
GLAD distinguished itself as a New England specific organization.  Kevin 
Cathcart, as then-executive director of GLAD, made an agreement that 
GLAD would work in the New England states while Lambda could work in 
the rest of the country.  When Cathcart became executive director of 
Lambda, he continued to honor this agreement, cementing GLAD’s regional 
identity.130 
GRA was originally the brainchild of Hastings law students Matt Coles, 
Jerel McCrary, and Bruce Coplen.131  Before graduating from law school in 
1977, the three discussed forming a public interest law firm for LGBT issues.  
Matt Coles solicited interest and funding from prominent gay political 
activists.  While most were sympathetic, they did not think the time was right 
 
124   Interview with John Ward, Founder of GLAD, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 21, 2013). 
125 Id.  
126 John Ward explained that these police entrapment cases were paying the bills for his private law 
firm as well.  In one case, he represented the predecessor organization to NAMBLA.  Id. 
 127 Interview with Cindy Rizzo, Former Board Member, GLAD, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 9, 2013). 
 128 Kosbie, supra note 49, at 125 (explaining language used in early GLAD publications). 
 129 Interview with John Ward, supra note 124. 
 130 Interview with Kevin Cathcart, Executive Director, Lambda Legal, Former Executive Director, 
GLAD,  in N.Y., N.Y. (Sept. 12, 2013). 
 131 Interview with Matt Coles, Director, Center for Equality, ACLU, Former Founding Member of 
GRA, in S.F., Cal. (May 31, 2012).  GRA would later become National Gay Rights Advocates. 
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for the new organization.  Eventually Richard Rouillard became involved 
and agreed to help fund the new organization.132  Rouillard was embittered 
over rejection by his family and set out to create a “gay ACLU.”133  On 
January 1, 1978, GRA and the private law firm of “Coles, Knutson & 
McCrary” simultaneously opened their doors at 540 Castro Street in San 
Francisco.134  The goal was to take paying cases through the private law firm 
and use the profit to support the public interest work of GRA.  Donald 
Knutson was a law professor at USC and was the most prominent of the 
founders.  By bringing him in as legal director, the founders of GRA hoped 
to attract prominent gay political activists to serve on GRA’s board and 
support the new organization.135 
When this public-private model failed, the private law firm split off from 
GRA.136  Later battles over Don Knutson’s leadership style led to a complete 
staff reorganization, with Jean O’Leary coming on board as Executive 
Director in 1981.  O’Leary was not a lawyer and served as the NGTF’s 
director before coming to GRA.  Because of this, she brought a media-savvy 
style to GRA.  Until its close in 1991, GRA remained more openly political 
than the other LGBT legal organizations.  Lawyers at GRA stressed the 
importance of public education.  According to Leonard Graff, there were so 
few victories in the 1980s that they were less concerned with setting bad 
precedent.  While they wanted to win their cases, the ability of a case to 
generate positive media attention was a key consideration for them.137  For 
example, in 1988 GRA sued the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) and the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) for failing to approve 
AIDS drugs fast enough.138  Outsiders criticized this lawsuit as a publicity-
raising stunt with no chance of success.  While recognizing the limited chance 
of success in the courtroom, GRA argued that the lawsuit could play an 
important role in bringing media attention to the responsibilities of the FDA 
 
 132 Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Bob Cohen, Executive Vice President of Legal Affairs, 20th 
Century Fox (discussing Rouillard’s involvement with NGRA).  Matt Coles specifically met with 
Frank Kameny and Bruce Voeller, amongst others. Coles explained that he saw the legal work as 
always political.  Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131. 
 133 Telephone Interview with Bob Cohen, supra note 132. 
 134 Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131.  540 Castro Street was directly across the street from 
Harvey Milk’s camera shop.  Telephone Interview with Bob Cohen, supra note 132.  
 135 Interview with Jerel McCrary (May 13, 2014). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Interview with Leonard Graff, Former Legal Director, NGRA, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 21, 2013). 
 138 See Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Civ. A. No. 87–1735, 
1988 WL 43833, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1988) (dismissing case filed by NGRA alleging drugs used 
to treat AIDS were unavailable to patients in the U.S. because the United States engaged in 
irrational and irresponsible conduct.). 
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and NIH.139  After the FDA changed some of its policies, GRA claimed that 
its lawsuit played a key role. 
GRA similarly worked to build an identity as a national impact litigation 
organization.  Originally founded as GRA, in 1983, it became National Gay 
Rights Advocates (“NGRA”), laying a claim to nation-wide impact.140  While 
its legal work was well-respected, NGRA also had a reputation for “shooting 
from the hip” at times.141  Lawyers at the other LGBT legal organizations 
respected the work that NGRA did, but they also questioned some of the 
litigation as either too risky or as a media ploy.  But NGRA embraced this 
image, describing the “aggressive legal posture” that the organization 
preferred.142  NGRA lawyers described the importance of positive media 
coverage to achieving sociolegal change and required plaintiffs to allow 
NGRA to use their names in media coverage.143  This media-savvy style is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the LGBT rights we think of today, but it 
does present a different style of doing them. 
In 1973, Wendy Williams, Nancy Davis, and Mary Dunlap founded 
Equal Rights Advocates (“ERA”) as an explicitly feminist legal organization 
in San Francisco.144  While not explicitly an LGBT legal organization, ERA 
was deeply concerned with the discrimination facing lesbians.  In 1974, 
Donna Hitchens interned for ERA while a law student.  Through her work 
at ERA, Hitchens was embedded in feminist political networks.  Prior to 
graduating law school, Hitchens applied for a grant from UC Berkeley, 
received funding, and opened Lesbian Rights Project under the umbrella of 
the ERA in November of 1977.145  She explained that other gay lawyers out 
there (predominantly men) marginalized child custody and other issues 
particularly affecting lesbians.146  LRP was thus founded with an explicitly 
lesbian feminist philosophy.  In a 1980 letter, Hitchens explained that LRP 
 
 139 See Memo from Ben Schatz (May 1988) (on file with author). 
 140 Name Change, . . . INTO CTS.: NEWSL. NAT’L GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates, 
S.F., Cal.), Summer 1983, at 1, 3; see also Interview with Leonard Graff, supra note 137 (discussing 
the name change of NGRA). 
 141 Interview with Jon Davidson (Aug. 24, 2013) (discussing NGRA’s reputation and its legal strategy 
compared to other organizations).  
 142 See Board Minutes (Oct. 1984) (on file with author) (describing Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 143 See id. (describing policy on plaintiff name usage); see also Interview with Leonard Graff, supra 
note 137 (explaining GRA’s relationship with the media).  
 144 See CAIN, supra note 31, at 65.  Mary Dunlap would later work for NGRA and the ACLU at different 
times and played a key role in LGBT legal organizing. 
 145 Interview with Donna Hitchens, Founder, Lesbian Rights Project, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 29, 2013).  
Hitchens also explained that it was important to her to work for a legal-specific organization.  A lot 
of her work was embedded in feminist networks rather than LGBT networks. 
 146  Id. 
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would accept almost any case on behalf of a lesbian where her sexual 
orientation was a major issue.147  LRP eventually became an independent 
organization and changed its name to the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights, but it maintained its lesbian feminist philosophy.  When LRP was 
founded, it did not have the same impact mission as the other organizations.  
Simply taking cases on behalf of lesbians was a form of impact.148  But as it 
established positive precedents in its core areas of custody and family issues, 
LRP increasingly focused on impact litigation. 
1.  How the LGBT Legal Organizations Talked About Litigation 
The dockets of the LGBT legal organizations in the late 1970s and early 
1980s included a diverse range of issues, including immigration reform, 
military discharges, employment discrimination, family and child custody, 
local nondiscrimination ordinances, prisoners’ rights, and education.  I use 
three specific cases to examine how the LGBT legal organizations talked 
about their litigation.  From these cases, we see that the LGBT legal 
organizations did not start out with an image of what constituted LGBT 
rights.  They started from instances of how the state infringed on sexual 
dignity and autonomy.  Both the right to be sexual and LGBT rights offered 
ways to describe the connections between these cases. 
In a key early case, Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,149 LRP 
“asserted that it was a denial of equal protection . . . for heterosexual state 
employees to be able to provide dental coverage for their spouses when 
homosexual state employees were unable to provide similar coverage for the 
family partners.”150  Hinman began after Boyce Hinman’s 1981 application 
for dental coverage including his partner of twelve years, Larry Beatty, was 
rejected by the state agency that he worked for.151  Regulations for the state 
dental plan limited coverage to a state employee’s spouse and unmarried 
children.152 
It is tempting to see Hinman as a precursor to modern same-sex marriage 
cases.  Viewed that way, it seems like a building block of LGBT rights.  But 
LRP did not argue for a right to same-sex marriage.  Instead, it argued that 
 
 147 See Letter from LRP to NGTF (1980) (on file with Cornell University Library, NGTF Files) (noting 
exception of when a lesbian could pay for a case). 
 148 Interview with Donna Hitchens, supra note 145. 
 149 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 150 Fair Treatment for Our Families, LESBIAN RTS. PROJECT (Lesbian Rights Project, S.F., Cal.), 1983, 
at 1. 
 151 Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412. 
 152 Id. at 413–14. 
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the state discriminated based on marital status.153  In its newsletters, the LRP 
would consistently explain that the state privileged marriage over other 
family forms.154  Rather than claim that lesbians and gays were just like 
everyone else, it argued that lesbian and gay families should be respected on 
their own terms.  People should be able to make choices about their sexual 
and family lives without coercion from the state’s preference for marriage as 
a family form.155 
Arguments based on privacy and a demand to be left alone by the state 
were a weak fit in litigation involving prisons.  In May, 1977, Lambda Legal 
initiated NGTF v. Carlson, challenging the policy of the  Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (“FBOP”), which excluded gay publications from prisons.156  The first 
step for Lambda was to travel across the country, taking depositions from 
prison wardens.  The FBOP denied any uniform policy on gay publications, 
so these depositions would establish the existence of a ban and document 
how the ban functioned.157 
Prisoners do not give up all of their constitutional rights, but their claims 
to rights are balanced against the goals of prison administration.158  Thus, 
typical claims of privacy or LGBT rights would not get far in NGTF v. Carlson.  
Lambda could not simply argue that the prison should leave gay prisoners 
alone or that gay prisoners were just like other prisoners.  Tolerance and 
equality were part of the case, but Lambda also had to assert the moral 
integrity of gay identities.  Lambda had to argue that the FBOP policy was 
harmful to gay prisoners.  One lawyer explained that litigation like Carlson 
took on “highly visible government programs where we were clearly second-
class citizens.”159 
Another area where we see this tension between the right to be sexual 
and LGBT rights is in immigration.  On June 13, 1979, Carl Hill and his 
lover arrived at San Francisco International airport to cover the Gay 
 
 153 See id. at 415 (“[P]laintiffs argue the term ‘spouse’ is not neutral as to homosexuals, and is not merely 
a classification based on marital status, but one based on sexual orientation.”).  Notably, LRP did 
not argue for a right to same-sex marriage. 
 154 See, e.g., Pursuing Equal Employment Benefits for Gay and Lesbian Family Partners, LESBIAN RTS. PROJECT 
(Lesbian Rights Project, S.F., Cal.), 1983, at 7 (pursuing litigation in which the state privileges 
married couples and not same-sex couples). 
 155 For a full articulation of this theory, see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) 
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008). 
 156 Federal Bureau of Prisons Agrees to Admit Gay Publications,  supra note 96, at 1.   
 157 Id.  
 158 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citation omitted) (“Many of the liberties and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner.  An inmate does not retain 
rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.”). 
 159 Interview with Leonard Graff, supra note 137. 
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Freedom Day Parade for the London Gay News.160  Because Hill wore a gay 
pride button, he was required to undergo a psychiatric examination by the 
Public Health Service (“PHS”).161  NGRA intervened, arguing that after 
homosexuality was declassified as a mental illness in 1973, PHS could no 
longer certify it as a “physical or mental defect or disease” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.162  In response to the pressure from this 
case, the Surgeon General issued an order on August 2, 1979 preventing the 
PHS from issuing the required “medical certificates solely because an alien 
[was] suspected of being homosexual.”163 
Hill returned to the United States on November 5, 1980.  This time Hill 
made an unsolicited declaration of his homosexuality to the immigration 
officials when he entered the country.  Hill’s statement deliberately provoked 
the new policy of Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)  of only 
enforcing the ban on lesbians and gays when they openly admitted their 
sexuality.164  NGRA again stood by to challenge INS’s new attempt to bar 
Hill from entering the United States  Now, NGRA argued that INS could 
not exclude an immigrant based on their sexuality without a medical 
certificate from the PHS, even if the immigrant openly declared their 
sexuality.165  NGRA argued that Congress intended for INS to defer to PHS 
in determining when immigrants should be barred for medical reasons. 
Several years earlier in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “psychopathic personality” in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act as a term of art intended to exclude 
homosexuals from the United States.166  One way to view NGRA’s litigation 
 
 160 Litigation—National, . . . INTO CTS.: Q. NEWSL. GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Gay Rights Advocates, S.F., 
Cal.), Oct. 1979, at 1. 
 161 Id.  Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, aliens with mental and physical disabilities 
including affliction “with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or mental defect[,]” could 
be excluded from entry into the United States.  Hill v. U.S. Immigration & Nationalization Serv., 
714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976)). 
 162 Litigation—National, supra note 160, at 1–2.  
 163 Hill, 714 F.2d at 1472; see also Litigation—National, supra note 160, at 2 (“INS lifted its order that Hill 
submit to the examination immediately after the U.S. Surgeon General issued a directive forbidding 
certification of homosexual aliens as excludable.”).  
 164 See Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473 (citation omitted) (explaining that the INS adopted a new policy which 
allowed an immigration official to examine an alien if the alien “makes an unambiguous oral or 
written admission of homosexuality”).   
 165 See id. at 1474 (“The issue presented is whether the INS may exclude self-declared homosexual 
aliens without medical certification of psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or mental 
defect.”).  
 166 Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967).  For a discussion on 
early twentieth century immigration law, which excluded aliens for sexual perversions, see 
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 19–54 (2009). 
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involving Carl Hill is as a narrow attack on Boutilier:  If the PHS would not 
certify lesbians and gays as psychopathic, then they could not be excluded.  
Under this narrow view, the litigation would be limited to interpreting a 
single statute and would do little for LGBT rights and nothing for the right 
to be sexual.  Because Carl Hill was not a U.S. citizen, NGRA’s lawsuit could 
only challenge INS procedure, not the underlying immigration policy 
itself.167  NGRA’s lawsuit did not directly contend that the state could not 
exclude homosexuals.168  Despite the narrow legal arguments used, NGRA 
and Carl Hill always understood these cases through the broader justification 
of establishing the “good moral character” of LGBT people.169  NGRA 
explained that they knew the litigation turned on the court seeing the dignity 
of LGBT people as much as the formal legal arguments. 
These broader justifications influenced the tone of the judicial opinions.  
NGRA’s December 1980 Newsletter quoted the initial decision of the 
immigration judge to admit Carl Hill to the country: 
When a person is, in effect, diagnosed as not normal or insane, he thereby 
becomes less than human with the inevitable result that he is not entitled to 
the same human rights as the sane or normal.  This, of course, obscures from 
consideration his civil rights and liberties.  Our legal system does not relieve 
us of the responsibility to consider a person’s rights on the basis of his foreign 
citizenship.170 
NGRA embraced the national and international media attention that the 
case produced, and in May 1983, officials from NGRA, Gay Rights National 
Lobby, and NGTF met with Reagan administration officials to discuss 
changes to immigration laws regarding lesbians and gays.171 
What emerges from these cases is not a well-planned agenda to achieve 
LGBT rights or the right to be sexual.  Instead, the LGBT legal organizations 
 
 167 See Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 541 F. 
Supp. 569, 571 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (citation omitted) (“Because he was an alien having no 
constitutional right to enter the United States, Hill was unable to directly challenge the propriety 
of excluding homosexuals from entry.”). 
 168 See Matter of Hill, 18 I. & N. Dec. 81, 82 (1981) (noting that the exclusion hearing focused on 
whether the applicant could be excluded without a certification stating that he was within an 
excluded class). 
 169 GRA Enters Two New Cases, . . . INTO CTS.: Q. NEWSL. GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Gay Rights 
Advocates, S.F., Cal.), Summer 1982, at 1 (discussing In re Longstaff, a case filed by the NGRA in 
which the petitioner was “denied naturalization simply because he is gay and therefore lacks the 
requisite ‘good moral character’”).   
 170 Litigation Report, . . . INTO CTS.: Q. NEWSL. GAY RTS. ADVOCATES (Gay Rights Advocates, S.F., 
Cal.), Dec. 1980, at 1, 2. 
 171 NGRA Meets with Reagan Administration Officials, . . . INTO CTS.: NEWSL. NAT’L GAY RTS. ADVOCATES 
(Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates, S.F., Cal.), Summer 1983, at 1, 3; see also Litigation Report, supra 
note 170, at  (“The Hill case has brought us important grants from foundations and has provided 
us with international media attention.”). 
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constantly articulated new justifications and demands on the state across a 
range of issues and legal venues.  I argue against any monolithic 
understanding of LGBT lawyers falling trap to the allure of the right to be 
left alone as the ultimate goal.  The right to be left alone is justified by a 
demand for tolerance but falls short of full equality.172  But some of the 
strongest criticisms of this assimilationist logic come from within the LGBT 
legal movement.  Recognizing the broader project of a right to be sexual 
shapes how we understand the history of LGBT litigation. 
2.  National Educational Foundation for Individual Rights 
When we turn to how the LGBT legal organizations began to organize 
their work together, we see further evidence that our present-day 
understanding of LGBT rights misses how the right to be sexual was part of 
their work.  The founding papers for the National Educational Foundation 
for Individual Rights (“NEFIR”) were signed at a February 1979 conference 
on “Law and the Fight for Gay Rights,” hosted at NYU Law.173  Donna 
Hitchens, the founder of LRP, explained that the idea for NEFIR probably 
originated more informally out of discussions between the lawyers at the 
different organizations suggesting that they needed some sort of coordinating 
mechanism for their work.  NEFIR included GLAD, LRP, NGRA, Lambda 
Legal, the Texas Human Rights Foundation (“THRF”), and a small number 
of independent lawyers and law professors.174  While NEFIR would explicitly 
work on “gay rights litigation,” its goals also included “the basic right to 
sexual expression . . . and private sexual conduct.”175 
Grant applications to support NEFIR describe the umbrella organization 
in grandiose terms.  One proposed budget for 1979 was over $100,000, 
greater than the budget of any of the individual LGBT legal organizations at 
the time.176  These applications described the purpose of NEFIR as 
 
 172 See SUZANNE DANUTA WALTERS, THE TOLERANCE TRAP: HOW GOD, GENES, AND GOOD 
INTENTIONS ARE SABOTAGING GAY EQUALITY 256–75 (2014) (contrasting tolerance with a robust 
claim to full civil rights and integration). 
 173 Rutgers Law and Lambda Legal also supported this conference.  See Invitation to Conference on 
Law and the Fight for Gay Rights (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Warner 
Papers).  I have not found any record of a discussion about NEFIR at this conference, but two 
interviewees independently remember this conference as where the papers were first signed.  
Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131; Interview with Donna Hitchens, supra note 145.  On 
May 2, 1979, NEFIR became a California non-profit corporation and later that year it received 
tax-exempt status from both the state and federal government. See Report to Playboy Foundation 
(1979) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Records). 
 174 See Report to Playboy Foundation, supra note 173. 
 175 NEFIR Project ‘81 Proposal (1981) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files). 
 176 See NEFIR Proposal (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files). 
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overseeing and coordinating the work and fundraising of all the legal 
organizations.  Despite this grand language, the LGBT legal organizations 
never intended to cede autonomy to NEFIR.  Instead, the grant language 
was designed to appeal to funders.177  The LGBT legal organizations did 
agree, however, that NEFIR would play a role in developing a legal resource 
bank and coordinating meetings between the organizations.178 
NEFIR quickly won a $15,000 grant from the Playboy Foundation.179  
Created in 1965, the Playboy Foundation supports work related to human 
sexuality, reproductive health, freedom of speech, and civil rights.180  In the 
1970s, it was one of the only foundations willing to support work related to 
homosexuality.181  Using the money from Playboy, NEFIR set out to develop 
a resource bank to include copies of relevant briefs, court decisions, expert 
witness reports, law review articles, and any other relevant materials.  NGRA 
took on the project of collecting material for the resource center, and NEFIR 
entered discussions with Golden Gate University Law School about locating 
the library there.182 
In addition to the resource bank, NEFIR also funded GLAD’s work 
compiling a lesbian and gay attorney referral guide.  This referral guide was 
a resource for the LGBT legal organizations themselves (allowing them to 
refer out cases that they could not handle on their own) as well as to the 
broader LGBT community.  Ultimately, GLAD published several versions 
of the guide, although later versions were after the demise of NEFIR.183 
Despite its ambitious beginnings, NEFIR soon collapsed.  Fights over 
organizational autonomy seem to have played a key role in the collapse of 
NEFIR.  While many of the organizations involved supported the idea of 
having a central organization to fundraise for coordinated projects, they also 
wanted to continue their own fundraising work.  NEFIR rules prohibited the 
 
 177 Interview with Donna Hitchens, supra note 145. 
 178 See NEFIR Board Minutes (Oct. 13, 1979) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) 
(agreeing to solicit proposals for resource bank); Minutes of Conference Call (Apr. 19, 1983) (on file 
with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (discussing Lambda’s role in organizing conference calls 
and other meetings). 
 179 See NEFIR Project ‘81 Proposal, supra note 175. 
 180    See Playboy Foundation, SOCIETY FOR NONPROFITS, https://www.snpo.org/publications/fundingal
ert_details.php?id=1988. 
 181 See Kosbie, supra note 49, at 208 (discussing Playboy Foundation support for the ACLU’s Sexual 
Privacy Project in 1973 and for NGTF’s challenges to exclusions of gays from the military in 1978). 
 182 See Correspondence Between NEFIR Members (1981-82) (on file with Yale University Library, 
GLAD Files) (discussing problems with locating resource library at Golden Gate). Despite extensive 
discussion with Golden Gate, it does not appear that any materials were ever transferred there. 
 183 See, e.g., Letter from Richard Burns, Board Member, GLAD, to NEFIR Board Members (Aug. 13, 
1981) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (discussing GLAD’s progress on guide). 
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LGBT legal organizations from applying for independent funding from any 
grant agency that NEFIR applied to.184 
By early 1983, discussions shifted from how to organize NEFIR’s activity 
to how to dismantle NEFIR.185  While the lawyers involved criticized how 
NEFIR itself worked, they agreed that some of its coordinating functions 
were critical to the success of the emerging LGBT legal field.186  Ultimately, 
GLAD maintained control of the attorney referral guide and Lambda Legal 
continued coordinating the conference calls between the organizations.  
NGRA appears to have kept the legal material it gathered for the resource 
bank, but there is no clear record of what happened to these materials.  The 
LGBT legal organizations also agreed to maintain the corporate shell of 
NEFIR to be used to facilitate a potential future LGBT legal conference.187  
Several years later, Lavender Law would use NEFIR to handle the 
fundraising and finances for its first annual conference.188  As Matt Coles 
explained, “NEFIR was sort of the early exploration of the idea of trying to 
get the legal groups coordinated and pooling resources.”189  Reflecting the 
humor of the time, Matt also noted that they used to say “When will we 
succeed? NEFIR!”190 
III.  SODOMY REFORM AND THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL 
Why did sodomy reform become central to the work of the LGBT legal 
field?  This question is rarely asked in other scholarship.  Sodomy reform and 
the right to privacy are largely taken for granted as the foundation for LGBT 
rights.191  Courts deciding same-sex marriage cases today cite back to 
 
 184 See, e.g., Letter from Rosayln Richter, Executive Director, Lambda Legal, to NEFIR Board 
Members (May 23, 1980) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (explaining that 
Lambda will still apply to Playboy Foundation despite NEFIR’s applications there). 
 185 See, e.g., Minutes of GLAD Board of Directors Meeting (Mar. 1983) (on file with Yale University 
Library, GLAD Files) (“The discussion in SF was slanted towards NEFIR not continuing to exist”). 
 186 See, e.g., Letter from Tim Sweeney, Executive Director, Lambda Legal, to NEFIR Board Members 
(May 20, 1983) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD Files) (identifying critical functions of 
NEFIR that should be preserved). 
 187 Donna Hitchens of LRP agreed to maintain the NEFIR shell. See Handwritten Notes (1983) (on file 
with Yale University Library, GLAD Files). 
 188 See Lavender Law Steering Committee Minutes (Jul. 1988) (on file with GLBT Historical Society, 
Donna Hitchens Papers). See also Letter from Bill Weinberger (May 25, 1988) (on file with ONE 
National Gay and Lesbian Archives, Weinberger Papers) (asking for donations payable to NEFIR). 
 189 Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 131. 
 190 Id. 
191     See infra Part II for discussion of historical foundation of LGBT rights. 
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Lawrence and Hardwick as they analyze the claims of LGBT rights.192  A rich 
doctrinal scholarship analyzes these cases, identifying the various 
assumptions that they make about the cultural meaning of privacy.193  
Scholars tell the legal history of LGBT rights through the prism of sodomy 
reform.194  There is good reason for this.  Sodomy reform was at or near the 
top of the agenda for LGBT legal organizations by the 1970s.  But forgotten 
in all of this is that sodomy reform was not only about litigation and not only 
about the right to be left alone.  My organizational approach to studying the 
emergence of LGBT rights forces us to ask why sodomy reform became 
central to the work of the LGBT legal field.  What emerges is that LGBT 
activists brought multiple strategies and motivations to bear on their early 
sodomy reform work.  The right to be sexual was as important of an 
organizing principle as the right to be left alone. 
In the most detailed study of sodomy laws, Bill Eskridge “traces the rise, 
evolution, decline, and fall of the crime against nature[.]”195  Eskridge 
attributes the changing regulation of sodomy to interactions between social 
movements and cultural, political, and constitutional values.  Challenging 
 
 192 See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
sexual orientation jurisprudence and specifically analyzing the holdings in Hardwick and Lawrence).  
 193 Following Hardwick, scholars analyzed the meaning of privacy and identified new arguments to 
protect LGBT rights despite the setback from Hardwick.  See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 
27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 533 (1992) (undertaking a “gay-friendly deconstruction of the 
new sexual orientation categories” under Equal Protection despite the holding in Hardwick); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 799–802 (1989) (reframing the injury of 
sodomy laws as the imposition of a heterosexual sexual identity upon lesbians and gays).  Following 
Lawrence, scholars again analyzed the meaning of privacy, now in relation to morality and other 
areas of the law.  See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage 
in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1185 (2004) (arguing that “Lawrence 
is neither irrelevant . . . nor dispositive” to the question of same-sex marriage); Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 1233, 1233–36 (2004) (arguing Lawrence only prevents use of explicit morals-based 
justifications for the law); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare 
Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1899 (2004) (using Lawrence to explore meaning of 
substantive due process and protection of human dignity).  Feminist and queer criticisms of Lawrence 
questioned the limits of privacy for protecting sexual rights.  See Catherine A. MacKinnon, The Road 
Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1090 (2004) (claiming that 
“[p]rivacy works to protect systemic inequality . . .” produced by sexual violence and patriarchy); 
Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights versus Queer Theory: What is Left of Sodomy after Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 
SOC. TEXT 235, 239 (2005) (“The Court, and the Constitution, will respect our sex lives, but on 
condition that our sex lives be respectable.”).   
 194 See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 27, at 169–253 (spending several chapters on development and impact of 
Hardwick); see generally CARPENTER, supra note 39 (discussing legal, political, and cultural factors 
influencing legal strategies in Lawrence); ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 15 (discussing “[t]he initial 
struggle . . . to protect private gay spaces”); Ellen Ann Andersen, The Stages of Sodomy Reform, 23 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 283, 318  (1998) (analyzing the phases of sodomy reform).   
 195 ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 2.  
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the idea that sodomy laws always regulated same-sex intimacy, Eskridge 
shows how following World War II, states added stiffer criminal penalties for 
sodomy and made their laws increasingly gay-specific.196  Beginning in 1955, 
many states established commissions to modernize their criminal codes.197  
Several states decriminalized sodomy or reduced the penalties for it as part 
of this process.  But in 1969, Kansas became the first state to criminalize 
sodomy for only same-sex conduct.198  Nonetheless, until 1980, LGBT 
activists continued to have some success with legislative decriminalization of 
sodomy.199 
This explains why sodomy reform was not obvious as the goal of LGBT 
rights when the modern LGBT legal organizations were founded.  Reform 
was ongoing in state legislatures and it was not yet clear if that effort would 
succeed.  My organizational analysis reveals that it was also not clear how 
sodomy reform would advance other goals of the LGBT legal organizations.  
Thus, rather than telling the story of how sodomy reform was the starting 
point for LGBT rights, we need to tell the story of how LGBT rights emerged 
and was shaped by debates over sodomy reform and the right to be sexual. 
A.  Sodomy Roundtables 
On November 20, 1983, the “Ad Hoc Task Force to Challenge Sodomy 
Law” first met at the ACLU’s offices in New York City.200  Organized by 
Abby Rubenfeld of Lambda Legal (who rented office space from the ACLU 
at the time), the Task Force included representatives from Lambda, GLAD, 
NGRA, LRP, THRF, NCSCL, and lawyers from several ACLU offices.  The 
Task Force’s goals included developing litigation strategies to overturn 
sodomy laws, providing information to lawyers working on relevant cases, 
 
 196 See id. at 88–108 (tracing change in sodomy laws between 1935 and 1961).  This book builds on 
Eskridge’s historical analysis in an earlier article, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and 
Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631 (1999).  Eskridge was a primary author on the amicus brief 
filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Cato Institute in Lawrence v. Texas, and the brief relies 
heavily on a historical analysis of sodomy statutes.  Brief of the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 9–16, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102). 
 197 For an in-depth discussion of state initiatives regarding sodomy laws, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, 
at 73-108. 
 198 Id. at 165. 
 199 See Andersen, supra note 194, at 297 (explaining that between 1971 and 1983, “the course of sodomy 
reform proceeded mainly through legislative reform and only secondarily through litigation”); 
Melinda D. Kane, Timing Matters: Shifts in the Causal Determinants of Sodomy Law Decriminalization, 1961–
1998, 54 SOC. PROBS. 211, 213 (2007) (noting that around 1980, the decriminalizing sodomy 
movement shifted from the legislative arena to the courts). 
 200 Lambda and ACLU Hold Conference on Sodomy Laws, LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1984, at 1, 3.  
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and advertising the existence of the Task Force to gay men and lesbians who 
might be arrested for sodomy.201  Rubenfeld explained that she chose to host 
the meetings at the ACLU offices partially to secure the legitimacy afforded 
by the ACLU name.202 
The roundtables, as the Task Force soon came to be known, played a key 
role in producing movement cohesion.203  Meeting two or three times a year, 
these roundtables provided a space for lawyers to debate constitutional 
theories for sodomy reform and share emerging new cases.  The roundtables 
were invitation only and always included the major LGBT litigation-oriented 
organizations.  Other lawyers, particularly those at ACLU state affiliates, 
were often invited when they were working on relevant cases.  Law professors 
working on law and sexuality were the final group of regular participants at 
these meetings.  Rubenfeld explained the reasoning behind only inviting 
lawyers to these roundtables:  The goal was debating and refining judicial 
arguments.  To keep the meetings productive, they wanted to only invite 
those with relevant expertise.204 
The LGBT legal organizations’ newsletters provide evidence of how the 
roundtables were an identity-building project.  Lambda Legal’s own 
newsletter announced that the meeting “represents the first joint effort of the 
ACLU and gay/lesbian rights organizations to fight anti-gay 
discrimination.”205  GLAD’s newsletters from the time advertised their 
ongoing participation in a new coalition effort to reform sodomy laws.206  
LRP described the “exchange [of] ideas and research” and their own role in 
“compiling a national list of psychiatrists and psychologists who might serve 
as expert witnesses.”207  NGRA described the new “strategy planning 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 Telephone Interview with Abby Rubenfeld, Former Legal Director, Lambda Legal (Apr. 18, 2014). 
 203 See ANDERSEN, supra note 46 at 121 (explaining that the “[t]he Litigators’ Roundtable, successor to 
the Ad-Hoc Task Force, played an important role in facilitating . . .” the incorporation of federal 
constitutional claims into sodomy cases); Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing in the Shadow of the Law: 
Lesbian and Gay Rights in the Aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, in 31 RES. IN SOC. MOVEMENTS, 
CONFLICTS, AND CHANGE 175, 192 (Patrick G. Coy ed., 2010) (“The Roundtables continued as a 
more formal coalition of various organizations headed by Lambda to coordinate litigation strategies 
among a variety of different issues.”); Arthur S. Leonard, A Retrospective on the Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, 
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 403, 410 (2000) (noting that Lambda hosts roundtable meetings every 
six months); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 973–74 (2010) 
("Lawyers at these lead organizations meet frequently, including at an annual litigators’ roundtable, 
to develop and implement strategy.” (footnote omitted)).  For criticism of the roundtables, see infra 
note 212. 
 204 Telephone Interview with Abby Rubenfeld, supra note 202. 
 205 Lambda and ACLU Hold Conference on Sodomy Laws, supra note 200, at 3. 
 206 See GLAD Annual Report 3 (1984) (on file with Yale University Library, GLAD files). 
 207 See Lesbian Rights Project Newsletter (1984) (on file with author). 
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conference” in its newsletters, and even the Gay Rights Coalition of the 
ACLU of Southern California mentioned the efforts.208  This prominent 
advertising of the roundtables, which tapered off by the late 1980s, signals 
how the lawyers understood their importance in developing a new field form.  
They saw the roundtables as conferring additional legitimacy on their 
identities as LGBT legal organizations.  As the form of the roundtables was 
institutionalized and assumed, it no longer merited mention in newsletters. 
While the first meetings of the roundtables were organized informally by 
Abby Rubenfeld as legal director of Lambda; by 1985 Lambda’s board of 
directors voted to officially incorporate the roundtables into Lambda’s 
goals.209  They defined the goals as focusing on litigation, legislation, and 
education efforts to repeal sodomy laws and providing a space for face-to-
face meetings between litigators.  By this time, LGBT legal organizations 
were preparing to challenge sodomy laws at the U.S. Supreme Court.  
During this Supreme Court challenge, the roundtables came to be taken for 
granted. 
This early history of the sodomy roundtables reveals a growing consensus 
that the LGBT legal organizations should coordinate their work and that 
sodomy reform litigation would be central to several overlapping litigation 
goals.210  But the roundtables were never only about sodomy.  The lawyers 
understood that the Court was not going to overturn sodomy laws based only 
on the right to privacy or the right to be left alone.  The Court needed to 
understand how sodomy laws infringed on concepts of dignity that went 
beyond narrow forms of LGBT rights.  Thus, discussions about sodomy 
reform were also discussions about all the other issues that LGBT legal 
organizations were handling.211 
By making the roundtables lawyer-only, the LGBT legal organizations 
set out to maintain space for critical dissent over litigation strategy.212  The 
 
 208 NGRA Newsletter (summer 1985) (on file with GLBT Historical Society, NGRA Files); ACLU of 
Southern California, Gay Rights Chapter, Newsletter (1984) (on file with ONE National Gay and 
Lesbian Archives, Gay Rights Chapter Files). 
 209 Sodomy Challenge Project, LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), 
Winter 1985, at 1, 5.  
 210 This coordination would result in a set of shared norms and expectations for an LGBT legal field.  
See NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 10 (2012) (describing shared norms 
as key element of an established organizational field). 
 211 Cf. NeJaime, supra note 6, at 677–78 (arguing that marriage, even though not explicitly mentioned, 
“set the stage for discussion, provided the context for analysis, furnished the basis for comparison, 
and highlighted the points of conflict” for discussions on LGBT issues). 
 212 At various times, different lawyers have criticized the roundtables’ exclusiveness.  My analysis 
identifies key benefits and limitations of the roundtable model, but ultimately these criticisms are 
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debate over whether to invite Arthur Warner underscores how the 
roundtables were in fact used to foster dissent rather than to create 
homogeneity.  Many of the lawyers at the LGBT legal organizations 
preferred to deal with Warner “at arm’s length” because of his difficult 
personality.213  Despite concerns that he would seek to dominate the 
conversation, Abby Rubenfeld ultimately decided to invite Warner because 
all the relevant voices should be heard in the debates over sodomy reform.214  
This institutionalization of dissent over legal strategy supports my argument 
that LGBT rights as a category was more capacious than we imagine it. 
B.  Pre-Hardwick Sodomy Reform Litigation 
Now I turn to debates within the LGBT legal organizations over sodomy 
reform.  In Walter Barnett’s 1973 study, prepared as part of a challenge to 
Texas’s sodomy law, Barnett explained that privacy offered the most obvious 
doctrinal foothold for sodomy reform litigation.215  But, Barnett stressed, the 
doctrinal meaning of privacy was not clear and its application to sodomy laws 
was uncertain.216  Barnett thus explored other legal theories that would apply 
to sodomy laws.  Barnett’s motivations for his study reveal the influence of 
the right to be sexual:  “Individuals should be encouraged, rather than 
discouraged, to venture as close to the line [of acceptable sexual behavior] as 
they wish.”217  
Barnett’s study set out the doctrinal tension between the right to be left 
alone and the right to be sexual.  Debates over sodomy reform within the 
LGBT legal organizations reveal the same tension.  In a classic explanation 
for the importance of sodomy reform, NGRA said:  “We consider the 
sodomy statutes important because, although rarely enforced, they create a 
hostile climate and provide specious justification for discrimination in 
 
beyond the scope of this article.  See Gabriel Arkles et al., The Role of Lawyers in Trans Liberation: 
Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 579, 586–94 (2010) 
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employment, the military, immigration, and child custody and visitation 
cases.”218  The concerns with a “hostile climate” and issues of military, 
immigration, and child custody all go beyond the narrow bounds of the right 
to be left alone. 
Lambda’s newsletters presented this broader set of demands as “the 
opportunity to make the sexual expression of our homosexuality legal in New 
York[.]”219  In an editorial comment in the Lambda newsletter, Rosalyn 
Richter connected sodomy reform to abortion rights.  She described the 
privacy interest at stake as “including the right to make choices affecting 
one’s body.”220  Richter framed the decision from the New York Court of 
Appeals striking down their sodomy law as based on this broader right. 
An NCSCL report at the ACLU biennial convention in 1983 provides a 
good example of how this tension played out with respect to specific doctrinal 
arguments.  The NCSCL report described a decision to add a motion to 
dismiss for discriminatory enforcement of sodomy laws.221  They were 
concerned that winning on this procedural argument could let the court 
avoid the substantive arguments about sexual privacy, but included it 
because a hearing on the question of enforcement would allow them to 
introduce statistical evidence showing how sodomy laws were used to restrict 
a wide-range of sexual conduct and choices.222  The same report explained 
the advantage of the consolidated appeal in People v. Onofre.223  In particular, 
including a prostitution arrest of a heterosexual woman would bring to light 
the full range of sexual choices implicated by the sodomy law, “making it 
more difficult to distinguish the ruling on a narrow factual pattern of the case 
below.”224 
Internal debates within the ACLU over sodomy reform are particularly 
revealing for understanding the complicated politics around the right to be 
left alone and the right to be sexual.  In 1966, the ACLU adopted a policy 
 
 218 Letter from NGRA to National Gay Task Force (1980) (on file with Cornell University Library, 
NGTF Papers). 
 219 The Challenge to New York’s Sodomy Statute, LAMBDA: NEWS FROM LAMBDA LEGAL DEF. & EDUC, 
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 220 Rosalyn Richter, Editorial, The Right to Privacy, NEWS FROM LAMBDA (Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. 
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 221 See NCSCL Report for 1983 ACLU Biennial Conference (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton 
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 223 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980).  In People v. Onofre, the New York state Court of Appeals in a 
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on sexual privacy that included homosexuality.225  The ACLU policy 
“support[ed] only the private behavior of consenting adults.”  It refused to 
take a position on the morality of any conduct and did not cover solicitation 
laws.  The policy also stated that “in certain jobs there may be a relevancy 
between the job and a person’s private sexual conduct, including 
homosexuality.”226   
This ACLU national policy embraced only the narrow right to be left 
alone as the justification for overturning sodomy laws.  But this was not the 
only voice within the ACLU.  A year earlier, the ACLU of Southern 
California adopted a policy on homosexuality with broader justifications:  
“In respect to private conduct by adults, each individual has the right to 
decide what kind of sexual practices he or she will or will not engage in, what 
techniques will be used, and whether or not a contraceptive should be 
used.”227  Even with the national board, there was fierce debate.  Some board 
members seemed comfortable with allowing sodomy laws to remain on the 
books, questioning only police enforcement practices, while other board 
members argued that the policy should logically extend to cover employment 
and other issues as well.228 
Using ACLU policy on privacy as a starting point, lawyers for the ACLU 
setting out to challenge sodomy laws pushed for a broader agenda that fully 
encompassed the right to be sexual.  Marilyn Haft described sodomy laws as 
a starting point for the work of the ACLU Sexual Privacy Project.  She 
explained that these laws are “a thin veneer for societal disapproval of 
differing modes of sexual orientation and life styles.”229  Haft saw overturning 
sodomy laws as one piece of the broader project of challenging social norms 
about sexuality.  Her correspondence related to potential sodomy litigation 
does not show a pre-determined legal theory but a grappling with various 
legal theories and fact patterns.230  Flowing from her understanding of 
privacy, her legal agenda included concerns with solicitation and loitering 
 
 225 See ACLU Board Minutes (Nov. 16, 1966) (on file with author). 
 226 See id. (noting in general that sexual orientation should not be a bar to employment). 
 227 Sex-Civil Liberties Statement Passed, OPEN FORUM (ACLU of Southern California, L.A., Cal.) Jan. 
1966, at 1. 
 228 Compare ACLU Board Minutes, supra note 225 (focusing on police enforcement practices as greater 
concern than sodomy laws themselves) with ACLU Due Process Comm. Minutes (Dec. 1965) (on 
file with author) (discussing extension of American Law Institute policy position to employment). 
 229 See Letter from Marilyn Haft to ACLU State Affiliates (June 25, 1973) (on file with Mudd Library, 
Princeton University, ACLU Papers) (describing founding of Sexual Privacy Project). 
 230 See id. Other correspondence in this collection discusses specific potential litigation, including fact 
patterns, state and federal laws, affidavits, and concerns with injury and standing. 
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laws, the dignity of LGBT prisoners, and the expression of gender 
nonconformity by trans people.231 
LGBT activists did see some signs that the courts might be receptive to 
the concerns raised by the right to be sexual.  Hardwick was the first time that 
the Supreme Court fully addressed the constitutionality of sodomy laws, but 
the Court had previously summarily affirmed a lower court decision 
upholding the constitutionality of a sodomy law in Doe v. Commonwealth’s 
Attorney for Richmond.232  An ACLU lawyer in Virginia argued the case after 
political activist Bruce Voeller discussed a potential sodomy challenge with 
Justice William Douglas.  Justice Douglas suggested that the Supreme Court 
might be open to a sodomy challenge if the case showed that plaintiffs “lived 
in dread of [the law’s] enforcement.”233 
According to the district court in Doe, the right to privacy enunciated in 
Griswold v. Connecticut was also about the sanctity of home and family.234  But 
the court did not consider homosexuality part of home or family life.  
Moreover, the court explained that sodomy laws are justified because 
homosexuality “is likely to end in a contribution to moral delinquency.”235  
The dissenting opinion described privacy in terms of “one’s decisions on 
private matters of intimate concern.”236  The advice from Justice Douglas 
and the dissenting opinion in Doe both reflect activists’ contention that 
privacy included respect for dignity and sexual autonomy. 
In People v. Onofre, which held New York’s sodomy law unconstitutional, 
LGBT legal organizations again hoped to bring a sodomy challenge to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.237  Unlike in Doe, which relied on affidavits testifying 
that the plaintiff feared prosecution, Ronald Onofre was prosecuted for 
private, consensual sex with another man, “almost unheard of in modern 
New York legal lore.”238  In addition to addressing concerns over standing, 
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this fact pattern allowed the lawyers to more vividly describe the violation of 
privacy in terms of personal integrity.  The Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in Onofre, but the opinion from the New York Court of Appeals partially 
reflected advocates’ understanding of the right to be sexual: 
[T]he right addressed in the present context is not, as a literal reading of the 
phrase might suggest, the right to maintain secrecy with respect to one’s 
affairs or personal behavior; rather, it is a right of independence in making 
certain kinds of important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct 
oneself in accordance with those decisions, undeterred by governmental 
restraint[.]239 
C.  Debates over Hardwick and the Right to Be Sexual 
Hardwick is remembered as “a carefully selected test case designed to build 
on a decade of legal and political mobilization[.]”240  Under this telling, 
Hardwick was the chance to finally test at the Supreme Court the LGBT 
movement’s claim that a narrow right to be left alone protected consensual 
sodomy in private.  This version of the story is not incorrect, but it misses the 
tensions over how to capture the broader right to be sexual. 
On August 3, 1982, Michael Hardwick was arrested for oral sex in the 
privacy of his own bedroom by a police officer entering Hardwick’s home on 
an invalid warrant.241  Clint Sumrall, who was working with the local ACLU, 
first identified Hardwick’s arrest three days later and contacted Hardwick.242  
Sumrall had been searching for a case to challenge Georgia’s sodomy law for 
the last five years, but every other case involved complicating factors such as 
marijuana possession.243  Hardwick’s case seemed perfect:  A police officer 
with no legitimate reason to be in Hardwick’s apartment arrested Hardwick 
in his bed for consensual sex.  Sumrall put Hardwick in touch with John 
Sweet and Louis Levenson who agreed to represent him.  John Sweet was on 
 
sodomy after evidence showed it was fully consensual.  This created a “perfect standing situation.”  
Id. 
 239 Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 939 (citations omitted). 
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case.”). 
August 2020] THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL 1429 
the board of the ACLU of Georgia, but he took the case as a private case and 
not through the ACLU.244  After the Fulton County District Attorney 
decided not to press charges, John Sweet asked another lawyer in his office 
to file a federal challenge. 
Kathy Wilde explained that she began receiving calls accusing her of 
“ruining the law for gays nationally” from the day she first filed the federal 
challenge.245  In particular, Arthur Warner of NCSCL was adamant that her 
federal challenge threatened the state-by-state approach to sodomy reform 
he had designed.246  The ACLU supported the case by the time it reached 
the Supreme Court, but initially it too resisted supporting Hardwick.247  
Because of the devastating loss in Hardwick, it is easy to give too much credit 
to these criticisms.  But at the time, most lawyers thought they could win.248 
By the time Kathy Wilde filed Hardwick in Georgia, the Texas Human 
Rights Foundation was waiting for a ruling from the federal district court in 
its challenge to the Texas sodomy law.249  When the sodomy roundtables first 
took up Hardwick, one of the key strategic questions was over the relative 
merits of these two cases as potential vehicles for a Supreme Court challenge.  
Unlike Michael Hardwick, Donald Baker was never arrested for sodomy.  
THRF recruited Baker for a proactive challenge to the sodomy law.  Baker, 
a former schoolteacher in Dallas, swore in court that he had sex with men 
and was afraid of prosecution under the state sodomy law.250  Michael 
Hardwick, the bartender, was sucked into his case after a citation for public 
drinking.  The lack of any arrests meant that Baker v. Wade lacked the visceral 
image of the police at the foot of Michael Hardwick’s bed.  On the other 
 
 244 Telephone Interview with Kathy Wilde, Former Lawyer for Michael Hardwick (Jun. 6, 2014); 
Interview with George Brenning, supra note 242. 
 245 Interview with Kathy Wilde, supra note 244. 
 246 See id. 
 247 When Hardwick was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, Kathy Wilde wrote to the legal director of 
the national ACLU requesting assistance.  ACLU national refused because the Georgia state 
affiliate was not involved.  See Letter from ACLU to Kathy Wilde (1983) (on file with Mudd Library, 
Princeton University, ACLU Papers).  George Brenning suspects that the ACLU of Georgia simply 
did not have the resources to dedicate to the case. See Interview with George Brenning, supra note 
242. 
 248 Immediately after oral arguments at the Supreme Court, some of the lawyers involved suggested 
they could win by as much as 7-2.  See Letter from Gene Guerrero, Executive Director, ACLU of 
Georgia, to Burt Neuborne, ACLU National (Apr. 2, 1986) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton 
University, ACLU Papers). 
 249 Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). 
 250 Id. at 1126, 1128. 
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hand, Baker did include a full trial record while Hardwick was appealed from 
a motion to dismiss.251 
In addition to the strikingly different fact patterns, lawyers at the 
roundtables debated the legal theories at play in the two cases.  The Texas 
sodomy law applied only to same-sex conduct.  This allowed THRF to make 
an equal protection argument unavailable in Hardwick.252  Because the 
Georgia law on its face applied equally to heterosexual and homosexual 
intercourse, any equal protection challenge would require extensive fact-
finding to show unequal application of the law.253 
Once the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hardwick, mooting the 
debate over which case was the best vehicle, roundtable discussions turned 
to oral arguments.  Because there were no out lesbian or gay lawyers in the 
country with experience arguing before the Supreme Court, lawyers at the 
roundtable settled on inviting Professor Laurence Tribe to argue the case.254  
Mistakenly assuming Kathy Wilde was a lesbian, some lawyers at the 
roundtable resisted this idea, suggesting that “one of us” should argue the 
case before the Court.255 
A final debate at the round table concerned the exact legal theories to be 
used in the brief to the Supreme Court.  The first draft of the brief included 
sections on privacy, equal protection, and due process.  One of the lawyers 
at the roundtables described this strategy as appropriate for academic 
analysis.  But, using it at the Supreme Court invited the Court to issue an 
 
 251 Cf. id. at 1126–1134 (summarizing the trial testimony by the plaintiff, plaintiff’s expert witnesses, 
and defendants’ witnesses and expert witnesses) with Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 
(11th Cir. 1985) (noting the procedural posture—an appeal from the district court’s ruling that the 
suit lacked standing, did not state a valid legal claim, and must be dismissed). 
 252 Justice O’Connor would later vote to overturn the Texas sodomy law at issue in Lawrence v. Texas 
solely on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 253 ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 36, at 235 (explaining that arguments in the case 
included an equal protection challenge).  While Kathy Wilde added a heterosexual couple to her 
original federal case in Hardwick, the district court dismissed them for lack of standing.  Id. at 234. 
 254 Multiple interviewees confirm that the idea to invite Tribe came from the roundtables but cannot 
recall exactly who suggested it.  See, e.g., Interview with Kathy Wilde, supra note 244; Interview with 
Jay Kohorn, supra note 85; see also ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 255 n.46 (confirming that the 
historical record is vague but recalls that members of roundtable task force suggested bringing in 
Tribe).  A year later, in 1987, openly lesbian lawyer, Mary Dunlap, argued before the Supreme 
Court in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 524 (1987). 
 255 See Interview with Kathy Wilde, supra note 244 (noting that she outed herself as heterosexual to 
these lawyers in later conversation).  Wilde participated in writing the brief but explained that she 
was happy to relinquish control of the case. 
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anti-gay ruling across all three doctrinal arguments.256  If the Court wanted 
to rule against the sodomy law, it would reach whatever legal theory it 
wanted whether or not it was in the main brief.  But LGBT legal 
organizations were already making important advances under equal 
protection.  Better not to risk that along with privacy and due process.257  
Responding to this concern, the final brief submitted to the Supreme Court 
focused more narrowly on privacy and the demand to be left alone by the 
state. 
There are multiple ways to interpret these debates.  Perhaps the most 
obvious way is just to see them as a debate over legal strategy.  Because of 
uncertainty over the precedential value of Doe and broader implications of 
privacy, Baker’s equal protection theory was arguably a more promising route 
to challenge sodomy laws than Hardwick’s privacy argument.  In addition, 
Baker’s factual record included testimony that could be helpful in establishing 
an equal protection violation.  A second way to interpret these debates is 
through the lens of a politics of respectability.  Donald Baker was an 
upstanding schoolteacher in a long-term relationship.  Michael Hardwick 
was a bartender having sex with a married man.  Donald Baker fit the 
wholesome American image better than Michael Hardwick.  By barely 
discussing homosexuality at all and stressing the narrow right to be left alone, 
the final brief in Hardwick also seems consistent with this interpretation.  
Without denying the validity of either of these, I turn to a third interpretation.  
These debates reveal the ongoing tension between strategies based on the 
right to be left alone and those based on the right to be sexual. 
Finally, I turn to the amicus briefs in Hardwick for further support for my 
arguments.  The brief of the LRP most explicitly argued for the right to be 
sexual.258  In a law review article introducing the amicus brief, Mary Dunlap 
described LRP’s brief as the only one to forthrightly argue for the legitimacy 
of LGBT people and relationships.259  In contrast, Dunlap described the 
main brief as arguing only that the state needs to leave LGBT people alone:  
Tolerance can include disapproval for what is tolerated.  Dunlap was right 
 
 256 Jay Kohorn voiced his concerned at a roundtable discussion regarding Tribe’s legal theories, 
arguing that the legal theories, while good, went against the strategy of forming consensus among 
lower courts prior to being argued at the Supreme Court.  See Interview with Jay Kohorn, supra 
note 85 (“[D]on’t play with these legal theories at the expense of our lives.”). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Brief for Lesbian Rights Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 11, at 9 
(“The Right To Be Sexual In Consenting, Non-Violent And Physically Private Ways Constitutes 
One Essential Dimension Of Personal Privacy Of The Adult Human Being.”).  
 259 See Dunlap, supra note 11, at 950 (describing the Lesbian Rights Project et al.’s amicus brief as 
unique because it took a more radical position than other briefs). 
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to describe the LRP brief as more explicitly arguing for a right to be sexual, 
but the LRP brief was not as radically different from the others as her 
description might suggest.  LRP’s amicus brief also drew on the right to 
privacy.260  The key difference is that LRP started from the importance of 
sexuality and built to privacy from there.  Lambda Legal’s amicus brief 
discussed homosexuality as a “healthy and natural expression of love”261 but 
focused on a more traditional understanding of privacy than evidenced in 
the LRP brief.  Lambda’s brief continued on to primarily focus on the failure 
of Georgia’s sodomy law to be narrowly tailored to any state interest.  Here 
Lambda’s brief wandered further from the right to be sexual, as alleged by 
Dunlap.  Finally, NGRA’s brief argued that state police power does not 
extend to regulating moral behavior.262  This can be read, as suggested by 
Dunlap, as a very narrow demand that the police leave LGBT people alone.  
Whatever else they can do, the police cannot enter the bedroom.  Another 
way to understand NGRA’s brief is through the literal image of the police 
officer standing in Michael Hardwick’s bedroom.  Understood through this 
lens, NGRA’s focus on the reach of police power is a visceral image of how 
the state denies the dignity and moral integrity of same-sex intimacy. 
IV.  CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO BE SEXUAL 
By tracing the development of LGBT rights from an organizational 
perspective, Parts II and III of this Article show the key role that the right to 
be sexual played in early LGBT legal activism.  The idea of LGBT rights 
emerged and was shaped by the right to be sexual as much as by the doctrinal 
categories of privacy and equal protection.  With this history as background, 
we are better equipped to understand the ongoing tensions in LGBT rights 
today. 
In constitutional litigation on LGBT rights, we see an ongoing tension 
between ideas of formal legal equality (LGBT rights) and respect for dignity 
and autonomy (the right to be sexual).  The right to be sexual is implicit in 
Romer’s rejection of animus,263 Lawrence’s emphasis on equal liberty and 
 
 260 Brief for Lesbian Rights Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 11, at 
9.  
 261 Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Respondents by Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et 
al. at 3, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85–140). 
 262 Brief of Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85–140). 
 263 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 632 (1996) (declaring that Colorado’s state constitutional 
amendment, which repealed ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, is “inexplicable by anything but animus”). 
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autonomy,264 and Windsor and Obergefell’s discussion of dignity.265  Together, 
these opinions reflect a new regime of respect for the autonomy of sexual 
conduct.  Most importantly, all four of these opinions reject a mode of 
constitutional inquiry that treats equality and liberty as separate and distinct 
inquiries.266  While none of these opinions explicitly recognize the right to be 
sexual, the growing recognition of liberty and autonomy carry with them an 
inherent recognition of the right to be sexual. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court explained that there was no 
history of protecting homosexual sodomy in the United States.267  In fact, 
quite the opposite, the Court claimed that homosexual sodomy had long 
been singled out and criminalized by every state in the country.268  Based on 
this view of the history, Hardwick described the claim that sodomy laws 
violated the right to privacy as “at best, facetious.”269  As a formal legal 
matter, the opinion was only about whether privacy extended to consensual 
sex between two adults in private.  The Court rejected claims to formal 
equality, or the idea that lesbians and gays are “just like” everyone else.  But 
Hardwick was also an expression of disgust towards lesbians and gays.270  It 
was a deep-seated rejection of the right to be sexual.  The lawyers understood 
that overturning Hardwick would not be simply a matter of changing privacy 
doctrine.271  It also required winning respect for the dignity of LGBT people. 
 
 264 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case 
involves liberty of the person both in its special and in its more transcendent dimensions.”). 
 265 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“There is dignity in the bond between two 
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763 (2013) (considering the notion that 
same-sex couples aspire to have the same dignity as heterosexual couples in lawful marriage). 
 266 See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (2004) (arguing the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence recognized the synergy between the doctrines of equal protection and 
due process). 
 267 See 478 U.S. 186, 192–94 (1986) (analyzing the history of sodomy laws). 
 268 Id. at 193.  However, Bill Eskridge challenges that conclusion, explaining that Kansas was the first 
state to single out same-sex conduct in 1969. ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 165.  Prior to 1969, 
sodomy laws included all sexually deviant behavior and data suggests that most arrests were not for 
consensual same-sex adult intimacy.  Id. at 98. 
 269 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194. 
 270 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77–84 (2010) (discussing principle of disgust within Hardwick). 
 271 For law review articles on this point from two prominent lawyers in the LGBT rights movement, 
see Hunter, supra note 193,  at 533 (describing a “gay-friendly deconstruction of the new sexual 
orientation categories”); Abby R. Rubenfeld, Lessons Learned: A Reflection upon Bowers v. Hardwick, 
11 NOVA L. REV. 59, 68 (1986) (stressing the importance of grass-roots organizing and education 
to overturn Hardwick in the future). 
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In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court indicated a new willingness to 
consider the claims of LGBT people.272  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
described the harm imposed by Colorado’s Amendment 2 in broad, 
sweeping language:  “[I]ts sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons 
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus 
toward the class it affects.”273  The majority opinion is very short, uses no 
footnotes, and barely mentions sexuality at all.274  As prominently pointed 
out by Justice Scalia in his dissent, the majority opinion did not mention or 
cite Bowers v. Hardwick at all.275 
This short opinion is susceptible to at least two major readings.  One 
reading is that Romer is a very narrow decision, barely changing existing equal 
protection precedent at all.  On this reading, Amendment 2 was invalid 
because it was blatantly discriminatory.276  Less overt discrimination might 
still pass muster.  According to this narrow reading, Romer said nothing about 
laws that targeted sexual conduct.  On the other hand, Romer’s discussion of 
animus supported a broader reading.  Louis Seidman explained that “most 
discrimination against gay people rests at bottom on moral disapproval, 
which the Court has now recharacterized as irrational animosity.”277 
I argue that Romer’s discussion of animus offers tentative support for the 
right to be sexual.  Romer is consistent with the principle that moral 
disapproval of sexual conduct is not a rational basis for the law.278  
Amendment 2 illegitimately defined a group for the sole purpose of casting 
them out from society.279  This conclusion is particularly supported by the 
 
 272 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 273 Id. at 632. 
 274 One academic describes these characteristics of the opinion as “generative.”  Louis Michael 
Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 
70 (1996). 
 275 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 276 See id. at 635 (describing the breadth of Amendment 2 as incongruent with any alleged government 
interest).  Several scholars have interpreted Romer in these terms.  See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution 
of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2317 (1997) (describing Romer as standing only for the “tentative” 
conclusion that “majorities cannot express overt hatred for groups”); Richard F. Duncan, The 
Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response 
to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 148 (1997) (describing Romer as “both narrow 
and shallow”); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 
257 (1996) (contending that Romer “does not significantly expand current law”). 
 277 Seidman, supra note 274, at 85. See also Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 93 (1997); see also id. (describing all laws singling out lesbians and 
gays as suspect based on an impermissible purpose analysis under Romer). 
 278 Barbara J. Flagg, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
833, 850 (1998). 
 279 See Farber & Sherry, supra note 276, at 258 – 60 (explaining the background of Romer and the 
Supreme Court’s ruling).  
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Supreme Court’s refusal to use the rationale offered by the Colorado 
Supreme Court.  Under the state court’s approach, Amendment 2 was 
unconstitutional because it disabled lesbians and gays in the political process.  
The Supreme Court relied on animus instead of the political process 
doctrine, which necessarily implicated questions of morality.280  In the 
broadest reading, Romer encompasses the relationship between equality, 
privacy, and bodily integrity in queer lives.281 
Lawrence v. Texas explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, announcing a new 
era of judicial respect for lesbians and gays.282  But the exact meaning of 
Lawrence was up for debate.283  Particularly noteworthy was Lawrence’s 
seeming rejection of the language of privacy for the language of liberty.  In 
its opening lines, Lawrence announced:  “The instant case involves liberty of 
the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”284  
Picking up on this language, some scholars went so far as to describe Lawrence 
as the gay rights movement’s Brown.285 
On this reading, Lawrence’s invocation of liberty embraced respect for 
decisional autonomy.  Noting that the opinion barely uses the word 
“privacy,” Nan Hunter argued that Lawrence signals a move towards “a new 
principle of equal liberty.”286  Lawrence accomplished this partially by 
recasting the Griswold line of cases as about sexual activity, rather than the 
abstract decision to become a parent.287  In so doing, Lawrence made consent 
and autonomy the touchstone of protection for sexual activity. 
 
 280 Flagg, supra note 278, at 841. 
 281 See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 219 (1996) 
(arguing that the Attainder Clause of the Constitution illuminates the opinion in Romer and the spirit 
of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 282 Even critics who read Lawrence narrowly agreed that it was an important decision for LGBT rights.  
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1399, 1401 (2004) (“The Court explicitly and unequivocally repudiated its prior jurisdictions in 
declaring that sodomy laws violate the U.S. Constitution.” (footnote omitted)). 
 283 In addition to the readings I suggest here, other scholars argued that Lawrence is based on tolerance 
or libertarianism.  See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 (identifying libertarianism as an underlying principle in Lawrence); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of 
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2004) (identifying tolerance as an underlying principle 
in Lawrence).  Lawrence’s meaning for morality as a justification for the law is also relevant, but there 
is greater agreement on that point that Lawrence only rejected “explicit morals-based rationales for 
lawmaking.”  Goldberg, supra note 193, at 1234–35 (footnote omitted). 
 284 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 285 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 193, at 1895 (“For when the history of our times is written, Lawrence may 
well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian America.”). 
 286 Hunter, supra note 266, at 1104.. 
 287 Id. at 1110. 
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Other language in Lawrence suggested that it still relied on a “privacy 
[that] relegates sexuality to the home, the bedroom, and then into the 
closet.”288  Katherine Franke argued that Lawrence embraced a “domesticated 
liberty.”289  Although Lawrence repeatedly invoked liberty, “Justice Kennedy 
territorializes the right at stake as a liberty to engage in certain conduct in 
private.”290  Franke contrasted the discussion of liberty in Lawrence with 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which she described as a “thick form of 
autonomy.”291  In contrast, Lawrence “resuscitate[s] a very early, more 
limited, and more institutional version of the privacy right.”292 
If Hardwick rejected the right to be sexual, Lawrence did not embrace it in 
full.  But Lawrence does show a partial and tentative embrace of the right to 
be sexual.  Two comparisons to Hardwick underscore this point.  Most 
notably, Lawrence rejected the fundamental rights inquiry used by Hardwick.293  
Hardwick held that there was no fundamental right to sodomy because it was 
not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”294  Lawrence 
rejected Hardwick’s discussion of the history of sodomy regulation, but the 
decision in Lawrence did not rest on whether there was a fundamental right, 
rooted in the history and tradition of the nation.295  Nan Hunter and 
Laurence Tribe both argued that in Lawrence, a newer model of substantive 
due process inquiry crystalized that turned the Court’s inquiry to whether a 
law imposed a dignitary burden.296 
 
 288 Ruthann Robson, The Missing Word in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 397, 398 
(2004).  While Hunter is correct that Lawrence barely references “privacy” as a doctrinal principle, 
it frequently discusses “private” conduct. 
 289 See Franke supra note 282, 1400 (arguing that Lawrence relies on “a narrow version of liberty that is 
both geographized and domesticated”). 
 290 Id. at 1403. 
 291 Id. at 1402. 
 292 Id. at 1404. 
 293 See Hunter, supra note 266, at 1107–14 (arguing that Lawrence more closely resembles Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Hardwick than Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Hardwick); Tribe, supra note 193, at 
1899 (“[T]he Lawrence Court . . . took the Bowers Court to task for the very way it had formulated 
the question posed for decision.”). 
 294 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (citing Moore v. E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 
503 (1977)). 
 295 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–74 (2003) (criticizing discussion of history and morality in 
Hardwick). 
 296 See Hunter, supra note 266, at 1122 (defining test in terms of arbitrariness of state action); Tribe, 
supra note 193, at 1936 (defining test in terms of state interference with primary relationships and 
associational rights). 
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Lawrence also makes equality far more important.297  In Hardwick, the 
lower court dismissed a heterosexual couple because they were at no risk of 
persecution under the law.298  The Supreme Court described the question 
before it as one of “homosexual sodomy,” even though the Georgia law in 
question was not gay specific.299  In Lawrence, on the other hand, advocates 
deliberately challenged a law in a state that was gay specific.  But the 
Supreme Court now expressly rejected a more limited equal protection-
based decision.300  Overturning the Texas law on this equal protection logic 
would have resulted in a sort of shallow, formalistic equality.301  But the Court 
chose instead a deeper equality that was about the dignity of the couples 
involved. 
Even to the extent that Lawrence can be described as using a privacy that 
relegates sexuality “into the closet,”302 that privacy was only accepted 
because the Court also tentatively accepted the dignity of human sexuality.  
Here, I ask whether we can imagine an opinion in Lawrence that reached the 
same legal conclusion but with a similar tone of disgust for gay sex as 
evidenced in Hardwick.  This counterfactual might be logically possible, but I 
argue that in practice it was impossible.  Privacy does not prevent the state 
from regulating a great deal of conduct that it finds truly deviant.303  It might 
be possible to imagine a Lawrence opinion that took a similar tone of moral 
distance to Stanley v. Georgia.304  But even that Lawrence would be different from 
the one that we have.  Lawrence only gets to where it does because of some 
partial acceptance of the dignity of human sexuality. 
 
 297 Some scholars interpreted Lawrence as primarily an equal protection decision.  See, e.g., Miranda 
Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of Group 
Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1313 (2004) (arguing that “Lawrence is more of an equal 
protection case than a substantive due process case).  But Lawrence itself expressly rejects equal 
protection alone as a sufficient basis for its decision.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75.   
 298 Kathy Wilde added this couple to the complaint to show the reach of the Georgia law.  The couple 
claimed that they regularly violated the sodomy law and feared arrest.  ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE 
PASSIONS, supra note 36, at 234–36.  
 299 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. 
 300 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“[T]he instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has 
continuing validity.”). 
 301 Laurence Tribe argued that the question of whether sodomy laws formally applied to everyone or 
singled out same-sex sexual conduct was irrelevant because sodomy was so thoroughly culturally 
identified with gay people.  Tribe, supra note 193, at 1905. 
 302 Robson, supra note 288, at 398. 
 303 Here, for example, it is relevant that Lawrence itself notes as a limit to the decision that it does not 
deal with prostitution.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 304 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559, 566 (1969) (overturning arrest for private possession of 
obscene material at home but suggesting such material might be without real worth). 
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However, Lawrence also signals deep ambivalence on the Court over the 
meaning of sexuality.  I think the Court does not even recognize this tension.  
Franke reads Lawrence’s description of the deep and intimate bonds between 
a couple as signaling a limit to the reach of liberty in Lawrence.  But the Court 
uses this language as a signal of how sexual autonomy is a basic part of human 
dignity.  Both of these readings are correct.  Like Franke, I fear that this logic 
can lead us down a road to accepting a domesticated liberty that at best 
accepts a right to be sexual for only some people.  But I also argue that we 
can exploit this tension, using the Court’s implicit and partial acceptance of 
the right to be sexual as a tool to further expand it. 
In United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, we see how the tension 
between the approaches of LGBT rights and the right to be sexual continue 
to shape Supreme Court doctrine.305  If liberty is the dominant theme of 
Lawrence, dignity is the dominant theme of Windsor.  But the locus of that 
dignity has also shifted.  Lawrence began a shift from the individual to the 
couple.  In Windsor, individual LGBT people disappear entirely.  The 
decision is now entirely about the couple, and sexuality is almost entirely 
absent from the pages of the opinion.306  Moreover, doctrinally, the opinion 
can be read as a narrow decision based on federalism rather than anything 
else.307  In this sense, Windsor can be read as a retreat further into the 
domesticated liberty that Franke described in Lawrence. 
On the other hand, the discussion of dignity is potentially a signal of a 
broader transformation.  On this reading, the liberty of Lawrence becomes the 
dignity of Windsor and represents a broader willingness of the Court to 
consider sexual conduct as a basic part of human identity.  Obergefell continues 
this trajectory.  On the one hand, it is even more couched in the notion of 
protecting the domesticated vision of marriage than Windsor.  On the other 
hand, Obergefell applies a more robust analysis to the state’s justifications for 
restricting activity based on sexual identities. 
 
 305 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“The fundamental liberties protected by 
[the Due Process] Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  In addition 
these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citations omitted).  See United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (explaining federalism concerns inherent in issue 
of marriage). 
 306 See Ben-Asher, supra note 21, at 258 (“[T]he legal homosexual is now consistently represented as a 
‘same-sex couple’ . . . while the term ‘homosexual’ has virtually disappeared.” (footnote omitted). 
 307 Justice Roberts stresses this reading of the opinion.  See id. at 261 (“[T]he dissenters emphasized 
that, after Windsor, it is still legitimate at the state level to confer dignity on opposite-sex couples but 
not same sex couples.” (footnote omitted)); see also Windsor, 136 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Court was not decided the question of whteher states may continue to 
“utilize the traditional definition of marriage”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Inherent to the history of LGBT rights is the tension between claims to 
being just like everyone else and claims to being different and deserving of 
autonomy and respect.  This Article offers deeper insight into how that 
tension has shaped debates within the LGBT legal movement, and ultimately 
how that tension has shaped the development of constitutional law. 
Lawyers at the LGBT legal organizations exploited the ambiguity 
between tolerance and the right to be sexual.  Tolerance demanded merely 
that the state ignore deviant conduct.  The right to be sexual defined allegedly 
deviant conduct as a healthy and natural part of the human experience to be 
valued and nurtured.  Tolerance has been described as too limited a 
justification for real social change, but this Article shows how tolerance was 
not merely a trap.308  Tolerance was a hook to begin a dialogue on dignity 
and LGBT rights. Before LGBT people could be accepted as just like 
everyone else, they had to be accepted for their right to be different. 
I do not mean to suggest that the courts are likely to embrace the right to 
be sexual in such explicit terms. But even without such explicit embrace of 
the right to be sexual, this Article has shown how doctrine regarding privacy 
and equality has subsumed at least some of the ideas generated by the right 
to be sexual. Thus, the history discussed in this Article suggests the key role 
that the right to be sexual could continue to play in new claims to LGBT 
rights.  
 
 308 Cf. WALTERS, supra note 172, 260–70 (discussing “the tolerance trap”). 
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